18801
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Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
Explanations of classical negation assume that knowing what it is for the truth-condition of some statement to obtain, independently of recognising it to obtain, we thereby know what it is for it NOT to obtain; but this presupposes classical negation.
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From:
Michael Dummett (The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [1991], p.299), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.1
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A reaction:
[compressed wording] This is Dummett explaining why he prefers intuitionistic logic, with its doubts about double negation.
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23609
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I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
If I wage war at the commandment of my Prince, conceiving the war to be justly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly, but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my Prince.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (De Cive [1642], 12.II), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 2.6
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A reaction:
Hobbes early says that Princes make things just by commanding them. This presumably assumes divine authority in the Prince. This is, of course, ancient pernicious nonsense.
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