12 ideas
| 15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: All circles of interdefinition are useless by themselves. But if we reach one of the interdefined pair, then we have them both. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) |
| 15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| Full Idea: Lewis revised his analysis of duplication because he had assumed that as a matter of necessity perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and that necessarily how a thing is intrinsically is determined completely by the natural properties it has. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998]) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
| A reaction: [This compares Lewis 1986:61 with Langton and Lewis 1998] I am keen on both intrinsic and on natural properties, but I have not yet confronted this little problem. Time for a displacement activity, I think.... |
| 15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A property is 'intrinsic' iff it never can differ between duplicates; iff whenever two things (actual or possible) are duplicates, either both of them have the property or both of them lack it. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) | |
| A reaction: This leaves me wondering how one could arrive at a precise definition of 'duplicates'. Can it be done without mentioning that they have the same intrinsic properties? |
| 15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The property of being an ellipsoidal star would seem offhand to be a basic intrinsic property, but it is incompatible (nomologically) with being an isolated object. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], V) | |
| A reaction: Another nice example from Lewis. It makes you wonder whether the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should go. Modern physics, with its 'entanglements', doesn't seem to suit the distinction. |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8) | |
| A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many. |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding. |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm. |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4) | |
| A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power? |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |