12 ideas
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6) |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts. |
9935 | Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Most accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified with serving one or another of either semantic theory (matching it to ordinary language), or with epistemology (meshing with a reasonable view) - always at the expense of the other. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], Intro) | |
A reaction: The gist is that language pulls you towards platonism, and epistemology pulls you towards empiricism. He argues that the semantics must give ground. He's right. |
17927 | Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf argues that realists about mathematical objects have a nice normal semantic but no epistemology, and anti-realists have a good epistemology but an unorthodox semantics. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973]) by Mark Colyvan - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.2 |
9936 | The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The principle defect of the standard (platonist) account of mathematical truth is that it appears to violate the requirement that our account be susceptible to integration into our over-all account of knowledge. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], III) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately he goes on to defend a causal theory of justification (fashionable at that time, but implausible now). Nevertheless, his general point is well made. Your theory of what mathematics is had better make it knowable. |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws. |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks. |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong). |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'? |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |