Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Lecture on Nominalism' and 'Certain Physical Essays'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [which I name from the Greek for 'ostrich']
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §4)
     A reaction: David Armstrong said this is the the fallacy involved in a denial of universals. Quine is accusing Carnap and co. of the fallacy.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
     Full Idea: Much of the theory of relations can be developed as a virtual theory, in which we seem to talk of relations, but can explain our notation in terms {finally] of just the logic of truth-functions, quantification and identity. The exception is ancestrals.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §8)
     A reaction: The irreducibility of ancestrals is offered as a reason for treating sets as universals.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
     Full Idea: 'Nominalism' is distinct from 'extensionalism'. The main point of the latter doctrine is rejection of properties or attributes in favour of classes. But class are universals equally with attributes, and nominalism in the defined sense rejects both.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §3)
     A reaction: Hence Quine soon settled on labelling himself as an 'extensionalist', leaving proper nominalism to Nelson Goodman. It is commonly observed that science massively refers to attributes, so they can't just be eliminated.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
     Full Idea: Generally speaking, to render a reason of an effect or phenomenon is to deduce it from something else in nature more known than itself, and consequently there may be diverse kinds of degrees of explication of the same thing.
     From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
     A reaction: There is a picture of a real explanatory structure to nature, from which we pick bits that interest us for entirely pragmatic reasons. Boyle and I are as one on this matter.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
     Full Idea: Explications be most satisfactory that show how the effect is produced by the more primitive affects of matter (bulk, shape and motion) but are not to be despised that deduce them from more familiar qualities such as heat, weight, fluidity, fermentation.
     From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:22), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
     A reaction: [Compressed, and continued from Idea 16736] So there is a causal structure, and the best explanations go to the bottom of it, but lesser explanations only go half way down. So a very skimpy explanation ('dormative power') is still an explanation.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.