5 ideas
| 16676 | Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: It is pointless to do through more things something that can be done through fewer. | |
| From: William of Ockham (Tractatus de corpore Christi [1323], Ch. 29), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.3 | |
| A reaction: The more famous formulation isn't found in his works, so I'm delighted to find an authentic quotation from the man. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 16675 | Every extended material substance is composed of parts distant from one another [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: Every extended material substance is composed of substantial parts distant from one another in place or location. | |
| From: William of Ockham (Tractatus de corpore Christi [1323], Ch. 12) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau glosses this as that 'bodies have corpuscular structure', meaning that they are made up of parts of matter (rather than just enformed matter, I think). |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: When one of two non-contemporaneous elements contains the grounds for the other, the former is regarded as the antecedent, and the latter as the consequence | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics [1715], p.201) | |
| A reaction: Bardon cites this passage of Leibniz as the origin of the idea that time's arrow is explained by the direction of causation. Bardon prefers it to the psychological and entropy accounts. |