12 ideas
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Numbers are merely a system of names devised by men for the purpose of counting. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) | |
A reaction: This seems a perfectly plausible view prior to the advent of Cantor, set theory and modern mathematical logic. I suppose the modern reply to this is that Peirce may be right about origin, but that men thereby stumbled on an Aladdin's Cave of riches. |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To say that 'if' there are two persons and each person has two eyes there 'will be' four eyes is not a statement of fact, but a statement about the system of numbers which is our own creation. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) | |
A reaction: One eye for each arm of the people is certainly a fact. Frege uses this equivalence to build numbers. I think Peirce is wrong. If it is not a fact that these people have four eyes, I don't know what 'four' means. It's being two pairs is also a fact. |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects. | |
From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions') | |
A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness? |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions. | |
From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox') | |
A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536). |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'. | |
From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem') | |
A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards'). |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
Full Idea: All positive reasoning is judging the proportion of something in a whole collection by the proportion found in a sample. Hence we can never hope to attain absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute universality. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) | |
A reaction: This is the basis of Peirce's fallibilism - that all 'positive' reasoning (whatever that it?) is based on statistical induction. I'm all in favour of fallibilism, but find Peirce's claim to be a bit too narrow. He was too mesmerised by physical science. |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It seems to me there is the most historic proof that innate truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error, and therefore a fortiori not without exception. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
Full Idea: A truth which rests on the authority of inspiration only is of a somewhat incomprehensible nature; and we can never be sure that we rightly comprehend it. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Even if we decide that an idea really is inspired, we cannot be sure, or nearly sure, that the statement is true. We know one of the commandments of the Bible was printed without a 'not' in it. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We never can be absolutely certain that any given deliverance [of revelation] really is inspired; for that can only be established by reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II) |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We can stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they will not connect themselves together in any rational way. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], I) | |
A reaction: The importance of this is its connection between imagination and 'rational' understanding. This is an important corrective to a crude traditional picture of the role of imagination. I would connect imagination with counterfactuals and best explanation. |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message. | |
From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution') | |
A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth. |