19 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: We should not use 'in virtue of' where it might express a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is irreflexive and asymmetric. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: E.g. he says someone isn't a bachelor in virtue of being an unmarried man, since a bachelor just is an unmarried man. I can't disagree. 'Determination' looks like the magic word, even if we don't know how it cashes out. |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: On my view, grounding relations depend on the natures of the properties involved in them. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I'm cautious about this if we don't find out more exactly what properties are (and they had better not just be predicates). Maybe properties are the only apparatus we have here, though I prefer 'powers' for the fundamentals. |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The fact that a given thing is spherical non-causally determines the fact that it has the power to roll. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Quine won't accept this, because you have added something called a 'power' to the ball (intrinsically, it seems), over and above its observable sphericity. Does being a ball 'determine' that it can't be in two places at once? Order of explanation? |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The logical principles about grounding include irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, and so forth. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.8) | |
A reaction: [It can't ground itself, there is no mutual grounding, grounds of grounds ground, and grounding judgements are not fixed] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: I think the most promising skeptical strategy is to insist on either identity or elimination wherever grounding is alleged to hold. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.9) | |
A reaction: This comes after an assessment of the critiques of grounding by Oliver, Hofweber and Daly. So we don't say chemistry grounds biology, we either say biology is chemistry, or that there is no biology. Everything is just simples. Not for me. |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry. |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4) | |
A reaction: It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding. |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The reason we must countenance grounding is that it is indispensible to certain important explanations. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I like this a lot. The first given of all philosophy is the drive to exlain. However, we mustn't go inventing features of the world, simply to give us the possibility of explaining it. The objective fact seems to be the without-which-not relation. |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: I deny that when p grounds q, q thereby reduces to p, and I deny that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q. ...On my view, reduction is nothing other than identity, so p is the same fact as q. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Very good. I can't disagree with any of it, and it is crystal clear. Philosophical heaven. |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The 'worldly' view of facts says they are obtaining states of affairs, individuated by their constituents and their combination. On the 'conceptual' view, facts will differ if they pick out an object or property via different concepts. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Might it be that conceptual differences between facts are supervenient on worldly differences (with the worldly facts in charge)? |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: If there is identity between water and H2O, we have neither the asymmetry nor the irreflexivity that explanations require. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Once you realise it is H2O, you understand its deeper features, which will open up new explanations. He's right, though. |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding. |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |