|
6474
|
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
|
|
A reaction:
This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum.
|
|
6476
|
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly?
|
|
6475
|
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
In perception, the idea of the subject appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants; it is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
|
|
A reaction:
In 1912, Russell had felt that both the Cogito, and the experience of meta-thought, had confirmed the existence of a non-permanent ego, but here he offers a Humean rejection. His notion of a 'logical fiction' is behaviouristic. I believe in the Self.
|
|
7590
|
Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
|
|
Full Idea:
According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics).
|
|
From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism')
|
|
A reaction:
These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two?
|
|
7589
|
Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
|
|
Full Idea:
Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine.
|
|
From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism')
|
|
A reaction:
The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer.
|
|
7593
|
Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
|
|
Full Idea:
Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality.
|
|
From:
report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas)
|
|
A reaction:
I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result.
|
|
7587
|
The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
|
|
Full Idea:
The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated.
|
|
From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion')
|
|
A reaction:
This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'.
|