5 ideas
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Sentences or assertions can be derivately called true, if they succeed in expressing determinate propositions. A sentence can be ambiguous or vague or paradoxical or ungrounded or not declarative or a mere expression of feeling. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.276) | |
A reaction: Lewis has, of course, a peculiar notion of what a proposition is - it's a set of possible worlds. I, with my more psychological approach, take a proposition to be a particular sort of brain event. |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001]) | |
A reaction: The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim. |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth, but differs mostly in denying that the correspondence of truths to facts must be one-to-one. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.277) | |
A reaction: In other words, several different sentences might have exactly the same truthmaker. |
16006 | Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Either Abraham was a murderer, or we confront a paradox higher than all mediation. His story therefore contains the teleological suspension of the ethical, and he becomes higher than the universal. If not, he is not a tragic hero or the father of faith. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling [1843], p.49) | |
A reaction: A nice dilemma for Christian thinkers who want to reconcile reason and morality with religion. [SY] |
7577 | Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: The story of Abraham (and Isaac) contains a teleological suspension of the ethical. ...In his action he overstepped the ethical altogether, and had a higher idea outside it, in relation to which he suspended it. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling [1843], Prob I) | |
A reaction: My immediate response is to find this proposal very sinister. I can't remotely understand what Abraham's (or God's) 'higher' idea could be that could justify this crime. Maybe ethics is suspended if you are on the beach and a tidal wave arrives? |