56 ideas
| 1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: He studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgement on all points. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.3 | |
| A reaction: In what sense was Pyrrho a philosopher, then? He must have asserted SOME generalised judgments. |
| 7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author, and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir, ...with moral intentions being the real germ of its life. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
| A reaction: This attitude is what places Nietzsche as the parent of post-modernism, and is the reason why most 'continental' philosophers seem to have given up the attempt to simply reason about life. It is anti-Enlightenment, and it is wicked. |
| 7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche famously defines metaphysics as the division of one world into two; the unity of the mythical pre-philosophical experience of the world is sundered, with Plato, into being and seeming, reality and appearance, supersensible and sensible. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
| A reaction: (Critchley doesn't give a reference; Idea 2860 is close). This is the discredited status that metaphysics gradually acquired after Kant, but I see modern metaphysics as reuniting human thought by digging down to the foundations to reveal roots and links. |
| 1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The Sceptics say that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8 |
| 11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'? ...Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth stepped before us. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §001) | |
| A reaction: I think this is one of the great moments in philosophy, when something that has been taken for granted, as a kind of mantra, is suddenly looked in the face and challenged. Truth at all costs? What sacrifices would you make for truth? |
| 17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
| Full Idea: Usually Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken as showing a limitation on the syntactic approach to an understanding of the concept of infinity. | |
| From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 05) |
| 17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to use non-mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach to foundations. We currently have no concepts of this kind which we can take seriously. | |
| From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 06) | |
| A reaction: Music to the ears of any philosopher of mathematics, because it means they are not yet out of a job. |
| 7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche's work is a resistance to nihilism. This is why he insists that new categories and values are required that would permit us to endure this world of becoming without either falling into despair or inventing some new god and bowing before it. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
| A reaction: The trouble is that all Nietzsche offers is the invention of values out of nothing by some wretched Germanic übermensch who is obsessed with militarism and dominance. If values don't grow out of human nature, then 'all is permitted'. |
| 2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We do not see a tree exactly and entire with regard to its leaves, branches, colour and shape; it is so much easier for us to see an approximation of a tree. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §192) |
| 6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables). |
| 20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. To what extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving. Our fundamental tendency is to assert that our falsest judgements are the most indispensable. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §004) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard objection to pragmatism, that what is false may still be useful, and that clever blighter Nietzsche embraces the idea! |
| 6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naïve realism is certainly worth attacking. |
| 6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578). |
| 1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The real problems of morality come into view only if we compare many moralities. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §186) |
| 20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To know 'who he is', we must know the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relative to one another. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly an essentialist view of a person, as having a 'nature', which is 'inner', and which we can try to specify. Ranking drives and values seems a good proposal for getting at it. I'm also intrigued by what people find interesting. |
| 2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §017) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful remark (which I have since found in Schopenhauer). I don't see how the most enthusiastic free will libertarian can deny it. |
| 2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The desire for 'freedom of will' is nothing less than the desire to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §021) |
| 20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Psychology is now once again the road to the fundamental problems. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §023) | |
| A reaction: This may become the epigraph of my great book, which will have as working title 'The Psychology of Metaphysics'. If you trawl through this collection, you will see where I am going! (A tough job, but easier than reading Hegel). |
| 2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The worst, most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist's error, namely Plato's invention of pure spirit and the good in itself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) | |
| A reaction: A landmark observation about the history of philosophy. Imagine if all the Aristotle had survived, but all the Plato had been lost. |
| 1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that by elevating the importance of the mind, Plato downplayed the wonders of the body, and by searching for a timeless Truth he degraded the indisputable fact of human temporality. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. X | |
| A reaction: Both ideas are very important. The second is widely misunderstood. Nietzsche was not a denier of truth. He asked us to scrutinise the role and value we assign to truth. |
| 2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
| A reaction: So do criminals |
| 23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche wants to judge actions not by what is done, but by the nature of the person who does them, and that is poisonous. We have to be horrified by what is done by Hitler and Stalin, without inquiring into their psychology. | |
| From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot p.37 | |
| A reaction: She says morality should focus on social needs, not on spontaneity, energy and passion. Nietzsche was very much a product of romanticism. Some of Nietzsche's heroes are military conquerors, so I think she is right. |
| 2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §153) | |
| A reaction: He is referring to the conventional morality of his contemporary society. Nietzsche clearly thought that actions motivated by love are intrinsically good. (Apart from murders by the jealous!). |
| 2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: You Stoics want to "live according to nature"? Oh you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Nature is prodigal and indifferent beyond measure - how could you live by such indifference? Living is wanting to be other than nature. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §009) | |
| A reaction: I think this is simply indicative of the slide from optimism to pessimism about nature in the intervening centuries. Stoics thought nature rational. See 'King Lear' for the transition. |
| 2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts. |
| 2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Throughout the longest part of history ('prehistoric times') the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences. but now men are unanimous that the value of an action is in the intention behind it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §032) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Kant's fault. No one thinks that a reckless or malicios action is innocent if no actual harm results. |
| 2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble soul has reverence for itself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §287) |
| 20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: All moralities are baroque and unreasonable ...because they address themselves to 'all', because they generalise where one must not generalise. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §198) | |
| A reaction: 'Particularism' is a recent label, but one finds passing remarks from many earlier philosophers which support that approach to ethics. No one was ever more opposed to strict moral rules than Nietzsche. |
| 2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: May I be forgiven for the discovery that 'virtue' has been harmed by nothing more than it has been by the boringness of its advocates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §228) |
| 20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To remain master of one's four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §284) | |
| A reaction: Compare this with 'Daybreak (Dawn)' 556. Solitude is the surprising addition, defended as the urge to 'cleanliness', when since humanity is 'unclean'. |
| 2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: An act of pity was during the finest age of Rome considered neither good nor bad. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §201) |
| 2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What does the claim that there exists in us a categorical imperative say of the man who asserts it? that 'what is worthy of respect in me is that I know how to obey - and things ought to be no different with you'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §187) |
| 2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §261) |
| 2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203) |
| 2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The thought of suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets through many a bad night. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §157) |
| 7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: In the 1880s Nietzsche diagnosed the concept of nihilism for a whole range of continental thinkers: the recognition of the subject's freedom goes hand in hand with the collapse of moral certainty in the world. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: Avoiding this dilemma is just one of the many bonuses offered to those who abandon the idea of free will. The fact that one can decide to be wicked doesn't bring an end to morality. Philosophers should think more concretely about human life. |
| 2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §062) |
| 6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche thinks that the human condition is precisely to overcome itself; we continually remake ourselves. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.261 | |
| A reaction: This is why I think of Nietzsche as a straightforwardly existentialist philosopher. There is a crucial distinction between 'remaking' ourselves and 'realising all our possibilities'. The latter seems right. Which view did Nietzsche take? |
| 20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is an ideal ...of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is, but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §056) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the main point of the idea of eternal recurrence. Could we inculcate this vision into the teenagers of our nation - that they should each try to design for themselves a life which they would be happy to endlessly repeat? Hm. |
| 20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every elevation of the type 'man' has thitherto been the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §257) | |
| A reaction: The aim of 'elevating the type "man"' does not figure in works of political philosophy very much! I doubt whether one could base a political party on the idea, and win a general election. Could the people still be sold the idea of aristocracy? |
| 20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A good and healthy aristocracy ...accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §258) | |
| A reaction: Something similar might be said of a democracy - that a slavelike workforce is needed to create the great universal goods we all want and need. Do the aristocrats want sacrifices for great art, or for wild parties and fox hunting? |
| 22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To us the democratic movement is ...a form of decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203), quoted by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche: the Revaluation of Values p.88 | |
| A reaction: It is not clear how a society of natural aristocrats followed by sheep would increase the value of mankind. Nor if the talented people are given total freedom, and the rest of us are servants. The value of humanity cannot reside in a few individuals. |
| 3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The idea of cause is relative to that of which it is the cause, and so has no real existence. Also cause must either be body causing body, or incorporeal causing incorporeal, and neither of these is possible. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
| 3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Motion is not moved in the place in which it is is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not, so there is no such thing as motion. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
| 17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |
| Full Idea: In analysis, the most natural conception of a point ignores the matter of naming the point, i.e. how the real number is represented or by what constructions the point is reached from given points. | |
| From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 13) | |
| A reaction: This problem has bothered me. There are formal ways of constructing real numbers, but they don't seem to result in a name for each one. |
| 2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Christianity is Platonism for the people. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) |