73 ideas
1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: He studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgement on all points. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.3 | |
A reaction: In what sense was Pyrrho a philosopher, then? He must have asserted SOME generalised judgments. |
1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Sceptics say that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8 |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The trouble with appeal to facts in the correspondence theory is that, in general, we have no way of indicating what fact a sentence, when true, corresponds to other than asserting the sentence. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: It is often claimed that coherence is more than 'absence of conflict' between beliefs; it also involves 'positive connections'. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Contemporary coherence theorists are advancing a theory of justification, not of truth, …with those who argue that truth is also coherence explaining it in terms of ideal coherence, or coherence at the limit of enquiry. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref) |
9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0) |
9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X) | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2) |
9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The rules of deduction are rules of entailment, not rules of inference. They tell us what follows from what, not what to believe on the basis of what. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.18) |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Asking how many beliefs I have is like asking how many drops of water there are in a bucket. If I believe my dog is in the garden, do I also believe he is not in the house, or in Siberia? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Propositional content is inseparable from possible error. Therefore no judgement, however modest, is indubitable. So if basic experiential knowledge has to be indubitable, there is no such knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Phenomenalism is a form of idealism. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The point of insisting on the absolute immediacy of sense data is that representation always seems to involve the possibility of misrepresentation. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Acquaintance with sense data is supposed to be a form of non-propositional knowledge, but how can something be non-propositional and yet knowledge? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables). |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: What exactly is supposed to be 'justified': a person's believing some particular proposition, or the proposition that he believes? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A key distinction. See my comment on Idea 3752. What would justify a sign saying 'treasure buried here'? People can be justified in believing falsehoods. How could a false proposition be justified? |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A theory that represents working practices as unworkable is a bad theory. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Good point. There's a lot of this about in epistemology, especially accusations of circularity or infinite regress, which (if true) don't somehow seem to worry the cove on the Clapham omnibus. |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: If we are to treat experience as the foundation of knowledge, then experience must itself be understood to involve propositional content. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This sounds right, but since pure 'experience' obviously doesn't have propositional content, because it needs interpretation and evaluation, then this strategy won't work. |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Empirical foundationists must decide whether knowledge ultimately rests on either beliefs or judgements about experience, or on the experiences or sensations themselves. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This clarifies the key issue very nicely, and I firmly vote for the former option. The simplest point is that error is possible about what sensations are taken to be of, so they won't do on their own. |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The foundationalists dilemma is to define a basis for knowledge modest enough to be secure but rich enough to be adequate. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: ..And that is just what they are unable to do, precisely because adequate support would have to have enough content to be defeasibe or fallible. |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A strongly justificationist view of rationality may not be so rational; we want the truth, but avoiding all errors and maximising our number of true beliefs are not the same thing. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: An interesting dilemma - to avoid all errors, believing nothing; to maximise true belief, believe everything. It is rational to follow intuition, guesses, and a wing and a prayer - once you are experienced and educated. |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Why should political theory ever have much to do with quantum physics, or pet care with parliamentary history? | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This hardly demolishes the coherence account of justification, since your views on pet care had better be coherent, for your pet's sake. It's a pity people can make their politics cohere with their ethics. |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Coherence theory implicitly assigns the criteria of coherence a special status. …In so far as this status is assigned a priori, the coherence theory represents a rationalistic variant of foundationalism. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: Nice move, to accuse coherence theorists of foundationalism! Wrong, though, because the a priori principles of coherence are not basic beliefs, but evolved pragmatic procedures (or something...). |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: From an externalist point of view, knowing about one's reliability is not required for 'first-order' knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Ah. 'First-order knowledge' - what's that? What we used to call 'true belief', I would say. Adequate for animals, and a good guide to daily life, but uncritical and unjustifiable. |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: A problem with pure externalism is that it ignores the social dimension of knowledge. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be contradicted by Idea 3573, which allows a social dimension to agreement over what is reliable. I am inclined to take knowledge as an entirely social concept. |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: According to Goldman's early causal theory of knowledge, my belief that p counts as knowledge if and only if it is caused by the fact that p. This is sufficient as well as necessary, and so does not involve justification. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I take his theory simply to be false because what causes a belief is not what justifies it. I expect my mother to ring; the phone rings; I 'know' it is my mother (and it is), because I strongly expect it. |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: It is not clear what would even be meant by supposing that there are causal relations to mathematical facts. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I agree, though platonists seem to be willing to entertain the possibility that there are causal relations, for which no further explanation can be given. Better is knowledge without a causal relation. |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Justification requires logical rather than causal connections. That is the point of the slogan that only a belief can justify a belief. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: It seems better to talk of 'rational' connections, rather than 'logical' connections. It isn't 'logical' to believe that someone despises me because their lip is faintly curled. |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The radical externalists' key notion is 'reliability', which is a normative condition governing adequate performance, involving reference to a range of conditions which we decide rather than discover. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: If we can decide whether a source is reliable, we can also decide whether a reliable source has performed well on this occasion, and that will always take precedence. |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: I may reach a belief using a procedure that is in fact reliable, but which I ought to distrust. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: The tramp on the park bench who gives good share tips. The clock that is finally working, but has been going haywire for weeks. Reliabilism is a bad theory. |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) |
6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naïve realism is certainly worth attacking. |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: All the sceptic's arguments show is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: The classical Five Modes of Scepticism are Discrepancy (people always disagree), Relativity ('according to you'), Infinity (infinite regress of questions), Assumption (ending in dogma) and Circularity (end up where you started). | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I take Relativity to be different from scepticism (because, roughly, it says there is nothing to know), and the others go with Agrippa's Trilemma of justification, which may have solutions. |
6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578). |
1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Armed with enough theory, we can see electrons in a cloud chamber. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality. |
3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The idea of cause is relative to that of which it is the cause, and so has no real existence. …Also cause must either be body causing body, or incorporeal causing incorporeal, and neither of these is possible. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Motion is not moved in the place in which it is is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not, so there is no such thing as motion. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |