24 ideas
5896 | Speak the truth, for this alone deifies man [Pythagoras, by Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Pythagoras advised above all things to speak the truth, for this alone deifies man. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Porphyry - Life of Pythagoras §41 | |
A reaction: Idea 4421 (of Nietzsche) stands in contrast to this. I am not quite sure why speaking the truth has such a high value. I am inclined to a minimalist view, which is just that philosophy is an attempt to speak the truth, as fishermen try to catch fish. |
3051 | Pythagoras discovered the numerical relation of sounds on a string [Pythagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pythagoras discovered the numerical relation of sounds on a string. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.1.11 |
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: At the age of 19 Saul Kripke published a completeness proof of propositional modal logic. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int V |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
Full Idea: Kripke gave a possible worlds semantics to a whole range of modal logics, and S4 and S5 turned out to be both sound and complete with this semantics. Hence more systems could be designed. S1-S3 failed in soundness, leading to 'impossible worlds'. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Marcus Rossberg - First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness §4 |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
Full Idea: Kripke's variable domain approach to quantified modal logic famously invalidates the Barcan Formula. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Ori Simchen - The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics §3 | |
A reaction: [p.9 and p.16] In a single combined domain all the possibilia must be present, but with variable domains objects in remote domains may not exist in your local domain. BF is committed to those possible objects. |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Kripke showed that the Barcan formula ∀x□A⊃□∀xA and its converse fail in models which require varying domains. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic [1959]) by Timothy Williamson - Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula §1 | |
A reaction: I think this is why I reject the Barcan formulas for metaphysics - because the domain of metaphysics should be seen as varying, since some objects are possible in some contexts and not in others. Hmm… |
7485 | For Pythagoreans 'one' is not a number, but the foundation of numbers [Pythagoras, by Watson] |
Full Idea: For Pythagoreans, one, 1, is not a true number but the 'essence' of number, out of which the number system emerges. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE], Ch.8) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.8 | |
A reaction: I think this is right! Counting and numbers only arise once the concept of individuality and identity have arisen. Counting to one is no more than observing the law of identity. 'Two' is the big adventure. |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures. |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary. |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue). | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1) | |
A reaction: At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue. |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would imply that objects with incompatible properties and objects such as winged pigs or golden mountains were actual. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §5) | |
A reaction: Note that this is 'qualitative' composition, and not composition of parts. The objection seems to rule out unrestricted qualitative composition, since you could hardly combine squareness with roundness. |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial. |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: The deep essentialist holds that most objects have essential properties such that there are many ways they could not be, or many changes through which they could not persist. Objects' modal profiles characterize their natures. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the view I like, especially the last bit. If your modal profile doesn't determine your nature, then what does? Think of how you sum up a person at a funeral. Your modal profile is determined by dispositions and powers. |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: Two objections to deep essentialism are that it falters when faced with a skeptical objection concerning arbitrariness, and the need for a reductive account of de re modality. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: An immediate response to the second objection might be to say that modal facts about things are not reducible. The charge of arbitrariness (i.e. total arbitrariness, not just a bit of uncertainty) is the main thing a theory of essences must deal with. |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: I reject the view that an object's de re modal properties determine its relations to possibilia. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §3) | |
A reaction: You'll have to read Paul to see why, but I flat disagree with her on this. The whole point of accepting such properties is to determine the modal profile of the thing, and hence see how it can fit into and behave in the world. |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
Full Idea: A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta. | |
From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world. |
3053 | Pythagoras taught that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God [Pythagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pythagoras taught that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.1.19 | |
A reaction: I like the link with health, because I consider that a bridge over the supposed fact-value gap. Very Pythagorean to think that virtue is harmony. Plato liked that thought. |
5244 | For Pythagoreans, justice is simply treating all people the same [Pythagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some even think that what is just is simple reciprocity, as the Pythagoreans maintained, because they defined justice simply as having done to one what one has done to another. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE], 28) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1132b22 | |
A reaction: One wonders what Pythagoreans made of slavery. Aristotle argues that officials, for example, have superior rights. The Pythagorean idea makes fairness the central aspect of justice, and that must at least be partly right. |
375 | When musical harmony and rhythm were discovered, similar features were seen in bodily movement [Pythagoras, by Plato] |
Full Idea: When our predecessors discovered musical scales, they also discovered similar features in bodily movement, which should also be measured numerically, and called 'tempos' and 'measures'. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 17d |
638 | Pythagoreans define timeliness, justice and marriage in terms of numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Pythagoreans offered definitions of a limited range of things on the basis of numbers; examples are timeliness, justice and marriage. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1078b |
553 | Pythagoreans think mathematical principles are the principles of all of nature [Pythagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Pythagoreans thought that the principles of mathematical entities were the principles of all entities. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985b |
554 | Pythagoreans say things imitate numbers, but Plato says things participate in numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Pythagoreans said that entities existed by imitation of the numbers, whereas Plato said that it was by participation. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 987b |
644 | For Pythagoreans the entire universe is made of numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Pythagoreans the entire universe is constructed of numbers. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1080b |
7467 | The modern idea of an immortal soul was largely created by Pythagoras [Pythagoras, by Watson] |
Full Idea: The modern concept of the immortal soul is a Greek idea, which owes much to Pythagoras. | |
From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.5 | |
A reaction: You can see why it caught on - it is a very appealing idea. Watson connects the 'modern' view with the ideas of heaven and hell. Obviously the idea of an afterlife goes a long way back (judging from the contents of ancient graves). |