58 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The central notion of philosophy since Kant is 'correlation' - that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: Meillassoux's charge is that philosophy has thereby completely failed to grasp the scientific revolution, which has used mathematics to make objectivity possible. Quine and Putnam would be good examples of what he has in mind. |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The Copernican Revolution is not so much the decentring of observers in the solar system, but (by the mathematizing of nature) the decentring of thought relative to the world within the process of knowledge. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
| A reaction: In other words, I take it, the Copernican Revolution was the discovery of objectivity. That is a very nice addition to my History of Ideas collection. |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The major shift that has occurred in the conception of thought from Kant's time to ours is from the unknowability of the thing-in-itself to its unthinkability. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
| A reaction: Meillassoux is making the case that philosophy is alienating us more and more from the triumphant realism of the scientific revolution. He says thinking has split from being. He's right. Modern American pragmatists are the worst (not Peirce!). |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Ever since Kant, to think science as a philosopher has been to claim that science harbours a meaning other than the one delivered by science itself. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
| A reaction: The point is that science discovered objectivity (via the mathematising of nature), and Kant utterly rejected objectivity, by enmeshing the human mind in every possible scientific claim. This makes Meillassoux and I very cross. |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity). |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No! |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature. |
| 18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Though it may appear that the intuitionist is providing an account of the connectives couched in terms of assertability conditions, the notion of assertability is a derivative one, ultimately cashed out by appealing to the concept of truth. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.5) | |
| A reaction: I have quite a strong conviction that Kitcher is right. All attempts to eliminate truth, as some sort of ideal at the heart of ordinary talk and of reasoning, seems to me to be doomed. |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
| A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
| A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
| 6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
| Full Idea: Kitcher says maths is an 'idealising theory', like some in physics; maths idealises features of the world, and practical operations, such as segregating and matching (numbering), measuring, cutting, moving, assembling (geometry), and collecting (sets). | |
| From: report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4.2.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be an interesting line, which is trying to be fairly empirical, and avoid basing mathematics on purely a priori understanding. Nevertheless, we do not learn idealisation from experience. Resnik labels Kitcher an anti-realist. |
| 12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Proposals for a priori mathematical knowledge have three main types: conceptualist (true in virtue of concepts), constructivist (a construct of the human mind) and realist (in virtue of mathematical facts). | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: Realism is pure platonism. I think I currently vote for conceptualism, with the concepts deriving from the concrete world, and then being extended by fictional additions, and shifts in the notion of what 'number' means. |
| 18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: What makes a question interesting or gives it aesthetic appeal is its focussing of the project of advancing mathematical understanding, in light of the concepts and systems of beliefs already achieved. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 09.3) | |
| A reaction: Kitcher defends explanation (the source of understanding, presumably) in terms of unification with previous theories (the 'concepts and systems'). I always have the impression that mathematicians speak of 'beauty' when they see economy of means. |
| 12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Insofar as we can honor claims about the aesthetic qualities or the interest of mathematical inquiries, we should do so by pointing to their explanatory power. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 09.4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a good enough account for me (but probably not for my friend Carl!). Beautiful cars are particularly streamlined. Beautiful people look particularly healthy. A beautiful idea is usually wide-ranging. |
| 12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The real numbers stand to measurement as the natural numbers stand to counting. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.4) |
| 12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: An important episode in the acceptance of complex numbers was the development by Wessel, Argand, and Gauss, of a geometrical model of the numbers. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: The model was in terms of vectors and rotation. New types of number are spurned until they can be shown to integrate into a range of mathematical practice, at which point mathematicians change the meaning of 'number' (without consulting us). |
| 18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: We perform a one-operation when we perform a segregative operation in which a single object is segregated. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.3) | |
| A reaction: This is part of Kitcher's empirical but constructive account of arithmetic, which I find very congenial. He avoids the word 'unit', and goes straight to the concept of 'one' (which he treats as more primitive than zero). |
| 18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: There is an old explanation of the utility of mathematics. Mathematics describes the structural features of our world, features which are manifested in the behaviour of all the world's inhabitants. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: He only cites Russell in modern times as sympathising with this view, but Kitcher gives it some backing. I think the view is totally correct. The digression produced by Cantorian infinities has misled us. |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: We must establish the thesis that what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
| A reaction: The truth of this thesis would permanently establish mathematics as the only possible language of science. Personally I have no idea how you could prove or assess such a thesis. It is a lovely speculation, though. 'The structure of the possible' (p,127) |
| 18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The method of infinitesimals is that you divide by the time, and then set the time to zero. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 10.2) |
| 12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The process of pure intuition does not measure up to the standards required of a priori warrants not because it is sensuous but because it is fallible. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 03.2) |
| 12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: If mathematical statements are don't merely report features of transient and private mental entities, it is unclear how pure intuition generates mathematical knowledge. But if they are, they express different propositions for different people and times. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 03.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the key dilemma which makes Kitcher reject intuition as an a priori route to mathematics. We do, though, just seem to 'see' truths sometimes, and are unable to explain how we do it. |
| 18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The intuitions of which mathematicians speak are not those which Platonism requires. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: The point is that it is not taken to be a 'special' ability, but rather a general insight arising from knowledge of mathematics. I take that to be a good account of intuition, which I define as 'inarticulate rationality'. |
| 12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical knowledge arises from rudimentary knowledge acquired by perception. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is an empiricist manifesto, which asserts his allegiance to Mill, and he gives a sophisticated account of how higher mathematics can be accounted for in this way. Well, he tries to. |
| 12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The constructivist position I defend claims that mathematics is an idealized science of operations which can be performed on objects in our environment. It offers an idealized description of operations of collecting and ordering. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right. What is missing from Kitcher's account (and every other account I've met) is what is meant by 'idealization'. How do you go about idealising something? Hence my interest in the psychology of abstraction. |
| 18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: I propose that a very limited amount of our mathematical knowledge can be obtained by observations and manipulations of ordinary things. Upon this small base we erect the powerful general theories of modern mathematics. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 05.2) | |
| A reaction: I agree. The three related processes that take us from the experiential base of mathematics to its lofty heights are generalisation, idealisation and abstraction. |
| 18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Proponents of complex numbers had ultimately to argue that the new operations shared with the original paradigms a susceptibility to construal in physical terms. The geometrical models of complex numbers answered to this need. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: [A nice example of the verbose ideas which this website aims to express in plain English!] The interest is not that they had to be described physically (which may pander to an uninformed audience), but that they could be so described. |
| 12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers who hope to avoid commitment to abstract entities by claiming that mathematical statements are analytic must show how analyticity is, or provides a species of, truth not requiring reference. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 04.I) | |
| A reaction: [the last part is a quotation from W.D. Hart] Kitcher notes that Frege has a better account, because he provides objects to which reference can be made. I like this idea, which seems to raise a very large question, connected to truthmakers. |
| 18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: I construe arithmetic as an idealizing theory. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: I find 'generalising' the most helpful word, because everyone seems to understand and accept the idea. 'Idealisation' invokes 'ideals', which lots of people dislike, and lots of philosophers seem to have trouble with 'abstraction'. |
| 18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: I want to suggest both that arithmetic owes its truth to the structure of the world and that arithmetic is true in virtue of our constructive activity. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Well said, but the problem seems no more mysterious to me than the fact that trees grow in the woods and we build houses out of them. I think I will declare myself to be an 'empirical constructivist' about mathematics. |
| 18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The development of a language for describing our correlational activity itself enables us to perform higher level operations. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: This is because all language itself (apart from proper names) is inherently general, idealised and abstracted. He sees the correlations as the nested collections expressed by set theory. |
| 18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The constructivist ontological thesis is that mathematics owes its truth to the activity of an actual or ideal subject. The epistemological thesis is that we can have a priori knowledge of this activity, and so recognise its limits. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.5) | |
| A reaction: The mention of an 'ideal' is Kitcher's personal view. Kitcher embraces the first view, and rejects the second. |
| 18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Conceptualists claim that we have basic a priori knowledge of mathematical axioms in virtue of our possession of mathematical concepts. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 04.1) | |
| A reaction: I sympathise with this view. If concepts are reasonably clear, they will relate to one another in certain ways. How could they not? And how else would you work out those relations other than by thinking about them? |
| 18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Someone who believes that basic truths of mathematics are true in virtue of meaning is not absolved from the task of saying what the referents of mathematical terms are, or ...what mathematical reality is like. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: Nice question! He's a fan of getting at the explanatory in mathematics. |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
| A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
| A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
| 18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: The original introduction of abstract objects was a bad way of doing justice to the insight that mathematics is concerned with structure. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm a fan of explanations in metaphysics, and hence find the concept of 'bad' explanations in metaphysics particularly intriguing. |
| 16756 | Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus] |
| Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms. | |
| From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2 | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be? |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: My term 'precariousness' designates a possibility of not-being which must eventually be realised. By contrast, absolute contingency designates a pure possibility; one which may never be realised. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
| A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this distinction, because I have often enountered the assumption that all contingency is precariousness, and I have never seen why that should be so. In Aquinas's Third Way, for example. The 6 on a die may never come up. |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The very notion of chance is only conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: Laws might be contingent, even though they never alter. Chance in horse racing relies on the stability of whole institution of horse racing. |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: What distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: These modern French philosophers explain things so much more clearly than the English! The 'speculative' version is seen in Berkeley. On p.17 he says transcendental idealism is 'civilised', and speculative idealism is 'uncouth'. |
| 12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: X knows a priori that p iff the belief was produced with an a priori warrant, which is a process which is available to X, and this process is a warrant, and it makes p true. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.4) | |
| A reaction: [compression of a formal spelling-out] This is a modified version of Goldman's reliabilism, for a priori knowledge. It sounds a bit circular and uninformative, but it's a start. |
| 12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: When we follow long mathematical proofs we lose our a priori warrants for their beginnings. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 02.2) | |
| A reaction: Kitcher says Descartes complains about this problem several times in his 'Regulae'. The problem runs even deeper into all reasoning, if you become sceptical about memory. You have to remember step 1 when you do step 2. |
| 12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge is independent of experience if any experience which would enable us to acquire the concepts involved would enable us to have the knowledge. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'conceptualist' view of a priori knowledge, which Kitcher goes on to attack, preferring a 'constructivist' view. The formula here shows that we can't divorce experience entirely from a priori thought. I find conceptualism a congenial view. |
| 12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: One can make a powerful case for supposing that some self-knowledge is a priori. At most, if not all, of our waking moments, each of us knows of herself that she exists. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.6) | |
| A reaction: This is a begrudging concession from a strong opponent to the whole notion of a priori knowledge. I suppose if you ask 'what can be known by thought alone?' then truths about thought ought to be fairly good initial candidates. |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: All aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought rather than to a perception or a sensation can be meaningfully turned into the properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: This is Meillassoux's spin on the primary/secondary distinction, which he places at the heart of the scientific revolution. Cartesian dualism offers a separate space for the secondary qualities. He is appalled when philosophers reject the distinction. |
| 12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: A 'warrant' refers to those processes which produce belief 'in the right way': X knows that p iff p, and X believes that p, and X's belief that p was produced by a process which is a warrant for it. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: That is, a 'warrant' is a justification which makes a belief acceptable as knowledge. Traditionally, warrants give you certainty (and are, consequently, rather hard to find). I would say, in the modern way, that warrants are agreed by social convention. |
| 20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
| Full Idea: According to Kitcher, if experiential evidence can defeat someone's justification for a belief, then their justification depends on the absence of that experiential evidence. | |
| From: report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], p.89) by Albert Casullo - A Priori Knowledge 2.3 | |
| A reaction: Sounds implausible. There are trillions of possible defeaters for most beliefs, but to say they literally depend on trillions of absences seems a very odd way of seeing the situation |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: How is mathematical discourse able to describe a reality where humanity is absent? | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: He is referring to the prehistoric world. He takes this to be a key question about the laws of nature. We extrapolate mathematically from the experienced world, relying on the stability of the laws. Must they be necessary to be stable? No, it seems. |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Hume's question can be formulated as follows: can we demonstrate that the experimental science which is possible today will still be possible tomorrow? | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: Could there be deep universal changes going on in nature which science could never, even in principle, detect? |
| 18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: To idealize is to trade accuracy in describing the actual for simplicity of description, and the compromise can sometimes be struck in different ways. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.5) | |
| A reaction: There is clearly rather more to idealisation than mere simplicity. A matchstick man is not an ideal man. |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific knowledge of entities possible. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: Meillassoux treats this as part of the Kantian Disaster, which made an accurate account of the scientific revolution impossible for philosophers. Kant's ego seems to have primarily an epistemological role. |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: The standard objection is that if the laws of nature were actually contingent, we would already have noticed it. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: Meillassoux offers a sustained argument that the laws of nature are necessarily contingent. In Idea 19660 he distinguishes contingencies that must change from those that merely could change. |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: We must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical laws, given that we take these to be contingent? | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: Meissalloux offers a very deep and subtle answer to this question... It is based on the possibilities of chaos being an uncountable infinity... It is a very nice question, which physicists might be able to answer, without help from philosophy. |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Since Descartes conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible access to an absolute reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
| A reaction: His point is that the ontological argument should be seen as part of the scientific revolution, and not an anomaly within it. Interesting. |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God's inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. | |
| From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim. Rather hard to agree or disagree, though the idea that atheism must qualify as a religion seems odd. If it is unqualified it does have the grand quality of a religion, but if it is fallibilist it just seems like an attitude. |