56 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The central notion of philosophy since Kant is 'correlation' - that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux's charge is that philosophy has thereby completely failed to grasp the scientific revolution, which has used mathematics to make objectivity possible. Quine and Putnam would be good examples of what he has in mind. |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The Copernican Revolution is not so much the decentring of observers in the solar system, but (by the mathematizing of nature) the decentring of thought relative to the world within the process of knowledge. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: In other words, I take it, the Copernican Revolution was the discovery of objectivity. That is a very nice addition to my History of Ideas collection. |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The major shift that has occurred in the conception of thought from Kant's time to ours is from the unknowability of the thing-in-itself to its unthinkability. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux is making the case that philosophy is alienating us more and more from the triumphant realism of the scientific revolution. He says thinking has split from being. He's right. Modern American pragmatists are the worst (not Peirce!). |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |
13750 | Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'. | |
From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30 | |
A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting. |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Ever since Kant, to think science as a philosopher has been to claim that science harbours a meaning other than the one delivered by science itself. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that science discovered objectivity (via the mathematising of nature), and Kant utterly rejected objectivity, by enmeshing the human mind in every possible scientific claim. This makes Meillassoux and I very cross. |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity). |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No! |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature. |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'It's true that Fido is a dog' gives rise to a contrastive focus on 'true', with the contrast class probably depending on members like 'it's false that...' or 'it's unlikely that...'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.3) | |
A reaction: If we introduce (from linguistics) the idea of a 'contrast class', then Ramsey's famous example begins to sound meaningful. It might occur in a discussion of 'did Antony actually say 'Friends, Romans. countrymen'?' |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.5) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be about linguistic predicates, and about semantics which draws on model theory. To see it as about actual 'properties' in the physical world makes no sense. |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A more radical alternative which takes names not to be referring even in the broader sense, but only takes speakers to refer with uses of names. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Given that you can make up nicknames and silly nonce names for people, this seems plausible. I may say a name in a crowded room and three people look up. |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Being a 'singular term' is not a category in contemporary syntactic theory and it doesn't correspond to any of the notions employed there like that of a singular noun phrase or the like. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has researched such things. This is an important objection to the reliance of modern Fregeans on the ontological commitments of singular terms (as proof that there are 'mathematical objects'). |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Identity between objects occurs in 'How Mary makes a chocolate cake is identical to how my grandfather used to make it', but does this show that 'how Mary makes a chocolate cake' aims to pick out an entity? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: This is a counterexample to the Fregean thought that the criterion for the existence of the referent of a singular term is its capacity to participate in an identity relation. Defenders of the Fregean view are aware of such examples. |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: When we ask 'is there a number?' in its inferential role (or internalist) reading, then we ask whether or not there is a true instance of 't is a number'. When we ask in its domain conditions (externalist) reading, we ask if the world contains a number. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.6) | |
A reaction: Hofweber's key distinction. The distinction between making truth prior and making reference prior is intriguing and important. The internalist version is close to substitutional quantification. Only the externalist view needs robust reference. |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words have a singular term use, and adjectival (or determiner) use, and the symbolic use. The main question is how they relate to each other. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Thus 'the number four is even', 'there are four moons', and '4 comes after 3'. |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The now famous Piraha language, of the Amazon region in Brazil, allegedly has no number words. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.6) | |
A reaction: Two groups can be shown to be of equal cardinality, by one-to-one matching rather than by counting. They could get by using 'equals' (and maybe unequally bigger and unequally smaller), and intuitive feelings for sizes of groups. |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The prime numbers are more fundamental than the even numbers, and than the composite non-prime numbers. The result that all numbers uniquely decompose into a product of prime numbers is called the 'Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: I could have used this example in my thesis, which defended the view that essences are the fundamentals of explanation, even in abstract theoretical realms. |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words as singular terms seem to refer to objects; numbers words in determiner or adjectival position are tied to counting. How these objects are related to counting is what the application problem is about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: You can't use stones for counting, so there must be more to numbers than the announcement that they are 'objects'. They seem to have internal relations, which makes them unusual objects. |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must establish the thesis that what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The truth of this thesis would permanently establish mathematics as the only possible language of science. Personally I have no idea how you could prove or assess such a thesis. It is a lovely speculation, though. 'The structure of the possible' (p,127) |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Frege's tying the objectivity of arithmetic to the objectivity of logic makes sense of the fact that can find out about arithmetic by thinking alone. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.1) | |
A reaction: This assumes that logic is entirely a priori. We might compare the geometry of land surfaces with 'pure' geometry. If numbers are independent objects, it is unclear how we could have any a priori knowledge of them. |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A major flaw of the neo-Fregean program is that it is more impressed by the technical result that Peano Arithmetic can be interpreted by second-order logic plus Hume's Principle, than empirical considerations about how numbers come about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a problem that would bother Fregeans or neo-Fregeans much. Deriving the Peano Axioms from various beginnings has become a parlour game for modern philosophers of mathematics. |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The results from the use of supervenience in philosophical theorising are limited. In particular, modal notions can't distinguish between things which necessarily go together. For example, that truths about numbers are grounded in truths about sets. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Reality can be seen as everything that is the case - the totality of all facts that obtain - or reality can be seen as everything there is - the totality of all things that exist. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: Things are a lot easier to specify than facts, but on the whole I prefer facts, just in order to affirm that there is more to reality than the mere 'things' that compose it. Our ontology must capture the dynamic and relational character of reality. |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: We do have reason to think that there are ineffable facts, and that these facts are systematically hidden from us. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.2.4) | |
A reaction: [Hofweber's Ch.10 is a lengthy and interesting discussion of ineffable facts] Things which are very very small, or very very remote in space seem obvious candidates. The most obvious candidates are tiny detail about the remote past. |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are simples arranged chair-wise is not a perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs have a content about ordinary objects, not simples arranged chair-wise. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 07.3.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber gives ontological priority to 'perceptual beliefs'. I'm inclined to agree, but I hear the critical hordes swarming against the gate. |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: My term 'precariousness' designates a possibility of not-being which must eventually be realised. By contrast, absolute contingency designates a pure possibility; one which may never be realised. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this distinction, because I have often enountered the assumption that all contingency is precariousness, and I have never seen why that should be so. In Aquinas's Third Way, for example. The 6 on a die may never come up. |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The very notion of chance is only conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Laws might be contingent, even though they never alter. Chance in horse racing relies on the stability of whole institution of horse racing. |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals are important for reasoning about the past and to plan for the future. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important to think about what would have happened if I had done things differently. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: A thought also found in Tim Williamson, but not the sort of thing you hear from Lewis or Stalnaker. It is a nice example of how highly abstract and theoretical problems need to be slotted into human psychology. |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: These modern French philosophers explain things so much more clearly than the English! The 'speculative' version is seen in Berkeley. On p.17 he says transcendental idealism is 'civilised', and speculative idealism is 'uncouth'. |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: All aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought rather than to a perception or a sensation can be meaningfully turned into the properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Meillassoux's spin on the primary/secondary distinction, which he places at the heart of the scientific revolution. Cartesian dualism offers a separate space for the secondary qualities. He is appalled when philosophers reject the distinction. |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: How is mathematical discourse able to describe a reality where humanity is absent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the prehistoric world. He takes this to be a key question about the laws of nature. We extrapolate mathematically from the experienced world, relying on the stability of the laws. Must they be necessary to be stable? No, it seems. |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Hume's question can be formulated as follows: can we demonstrate that the experimental science which is possible today will still be possible tomorrow? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Could there be deep universal changes going on in nature which science could never, even in principle, detect? |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific knowledge of entities possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux treats this as part of the Kantian Disaster, which made an accurate account of the scientific revolution impossible for philosophers. Kant's ego seems to have primarily an epistemological role. |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The picture of language often called the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in natural languages refers; they simply differ in what they refer to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that at least there are syncategorematic terms like 'not' and 'or' and 'maybe' that are internal to language. I'm inclining to the opposite view of Paul Pietroski. Hofweber says if all words are names, they can't add up to truth. |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: An inferential role semantics is generally seen as a large-scale alternative to a semantics based on reference and other language-world relations. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.4.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the other obvious language-world relation is truth. Being a robust realist, I take it I have to be strongly committed to semantics which connects to the world - or do I? Reality is robust, but our talk about it is evasive? |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Syntactic form is not only related to the truth conditions of a sentence; it is also related to what focus an utterance of a sentence will have. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.5.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has commendably studied some linguistics. The idea of mental and linguistic 'focus' increasingly strikes me as of importance in many areas of philosophy. E.g. in the scope of ethics, on whom should you focus? |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Simply because there is no single word in a certain language for a certain property doesn't mean that it isn't expressible in that language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.1.1) | |
A reaction: Good. For example a shade of blue for which there is no label might be 'the next darkest discriminable shade of blue adjacent to the one we are looking at'. And then the one after that... But 'tastes better than Diet Pepsi' in ancient Greek? |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: It is said that not every property can be expressed because there are more properties than there are predicates. ...But the same predicate can be used to express many different properties: 'being taller than this' depends on what 'this' refers to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.2) | |
A reaction: A good example, but being a comparative and relying on a demonstrative indexical makes it a favourable example. 'Being made of iron' doesn't have much scope for expressing many properties. |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Compositional semantics assigns semantic values to various expressions in order to generate the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can occur correctly, ...thus leading to the truth-conditions of the sentence. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.3) | |
A reaction: I favour both the compositional and the truth-conditional accounts of semantics, but I am not sure how to fit the pragmatic and contextual ingredient into that picture. You can't leave out psychology. |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there propositions then they do not have content, because they are content. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds right. A rather obvious regress threatens if you say otherwise. |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there are no propositions, then there are no contents, and thus there are no beliefs and desires. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.4.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. Those who claim that there are only sentences (and no propositions) can hardly claim that you must formulate a sentence every time you have a specific belief or desire. |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Might there be some thought token that has a different content than any such token we can in principle have? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.3.3) | |
A reaction: For me the idea that a thought might exist which can never be thought is an absurdity, but people who believe in the external existence of parts of reality called 'propositions' seem committed to it. A baffling view. |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Semantic type coercion' is where an expression of variable type is forced to take a particular type on a particular occasion so that the sentence as a whole in which it occurse is semantically interpretable. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.4.4) | |
A reaction: He compares 'and' in 'John sang and Mary danced' with 'John and Mary danced together', where 'and' can vary in type, and we adopt the reading that makes sense. Hofweber says we do this with number language. He favours 'cognitive need'. |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Background deletion' is the pheomenon that what isn't focused in an answer, what is the background, can be left out of the answer, with the resulting sub-sentential answer nonetheless being appropriate. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.2) | |
A reaction: [I'm struck by the verbosity of this sentence, from an over-long book] It is not unreasonable to think that each conversational exchange has an implicit and agreed domain of quantification. Well, 'focus', then. |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The standard objection is that if the laws of nature were actually contingent, we would already have noticed it. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux offers a sustained argument that the laws of nature are necessarily contingent. In Idea 19660 he distinguishes contingencies that must change from those that merely could change. |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical laws, given that we take these to be contingent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meissalloux offers a very deep and subtle answer to this question... It is based on the possibilities of chaos being an uncountable infinity... It is a very nice question, which physicists might be able to answer, without help from philosophy. |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Descartes conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible access to an absolute reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that the ontological argument should be seen as part of the scientific revolution, and not an anomaly within it. Interesting. |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God's inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. Rather hard to agree or disagree, though the idea that atheism must qualify as a religion seems odd. If it is unqualified it does have the grand quality of a religion, but if it is fallibilist it just seems like an attitude. |