40 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The central notion of philosophy since Kant is 'correlation' - that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux's charge is that philosophy has thereby completely failed to grasp the scientific revolution, which has used mathematics to make objectivity possible. Quine and Putnam would be good examples of what he has in mind. |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The Copernican Revolution is not so much the decentring of observers in the solar system, but (by the mathematizing of nature) the decentring of thought relative to the world within the process of knowledge. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: In other words, I take it, the Copernican Revolution was the discovery of objectivity. That is a very nice addition to my History of Ideas collection. |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The major shift that has occurred in the conception of thought from Kant's time to ours is from the unknowability of the thing-in-itself to its unthinkability. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux is making the case that philosophy is alienating us more and more from the triumphant realism of the scientific revolution. He says thinking has split from being. He's right. Modern American pragmatists are the worst (not Peirce!). |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Ever since Kant, to think science as a philosopher has been to claim that science harbours a meaning other than the one delivered by science itself. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that science discovered objectivity (via the mathematising of nature), and Kant utterly rejected objectivity, by enmeshing the human mind in every possible scientific claim. This makes Meillassoux and I very cross. |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity). |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No! |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature. |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence. |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition. |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must establish the thesis that what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The truth of this thesis would permanently establish mathematics as the only possible language of science. Personally I have no idea how you could prove or assess such a thesis. It is a lovely speculation, though. 'The structure of the possible' (p,127) |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city. |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples. |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100) | |
A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas. |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3 | |
A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195) |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist? |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95) | |
A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful. |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything. |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion). |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient. |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: My term 'precariousness' designates a possibility of not-being which must eventually be realised. By contrast, absolute contingency designates a pure possibility; one which may never be realised. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this distinction, because I have often enountered the assumption that all contingency is precariousness, and I have never seen why that should be so. In Aquinas's Third Way, for example. The 6 on a die may never come up. |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The very notion of chance is only conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Laws might be contingent, even though they never alter. Chance in horse racing relies on the stability of whole institution of horse racing. |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: These modern French philosophers explain things so much more clearly than the English! The 'speculative' version is seen in Berkeley. On p.17 he says transcendental idealism is 'civilised', and speculative idealism is 'uncouth'. |
9379 | A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine] |
Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question. | |
From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"? |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: All aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought rather than to a perception or a sensation can be meaningfully turned into the properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Meillassoux's spin on the primary/secondary distinction, which he places at the heart of the scientific revolution. Cartesian dualism offers a separate space for the secondary qualities. He is appalled when philosophers reject the distinction. |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: How is mathematical discourse able to describe a reality where humanity is absent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the prehistoric world. He takes this to be a key question about the laws of nature. We extrapolate mathematically from the experienced world, relying on the stability of the laws. Must they be necessary to be stable? No, it seems. |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Hume's question can be formulated as follows: can we demonstrate that the experimental science which is possible today will still be possible tomorrow? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Could there be deep universal changes going on in nature which science could never, even in principle, detect? |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas. |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific knowledge of entities possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux treats this as part of the Kantian Disaster, which made an accurate account of the scientific revolution impossible for philosophers. Kant's ego seems to have primarily an epistemological role. |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102) | |
A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention. |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation. |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The standard objection is that if the laws of nature were actually contingent, we would already have noticed it. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux offers a sustained argument that the laws of nature are necessarily contingent. In Idea 19660 he distinguishes contingencies that must change from those that merely could change. |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical laws, given that we take these to be contingent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meissalloux offers a very deep and subtle answer to this question... It is based on the possibilities of chaos being an uncountable infinity... It is a very nice question, which physicists might be able to answer, without help from philosophy. |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Descartes conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible access to an absolute reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that the ontological argument should be seen as part of the scientific revolution, and not an anomaly within it. Interesting. |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God's inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. Rather hard to agree or disagree, though the idea that atheism must qualify as a religion seems odd. If it is unqualified it does have the grand quality of a religion, but if it is fallibilist it just seems like an attitude. |