Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' and 'The Facts of Causation'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity

9355	One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
	Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
	From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
	A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

10365	We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

6343	For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
	Full Idea: Given Russell's notion of a proposition, as an arrangement of objects and properties, it is hard to see how there could be any difference at all between such a proposition and the fact corresponding to it, since they each involve the same arrangement.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.7.35
	A reaction: This seems a little unfair, given that Russell (in 1912) uses the notion now referred to as 'congruence', so that the correspondence is not in the objects and properties, but in how they are 'ordered', which may differ between proposition and fact.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

7534	In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
	Full Idea: With a characteristic readiness to abandon views that he had previously considered definitively correct, Russell declared in 1906 that there were, after all, no such 'things' as propositions. It is judgements that are true or false.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6
	A reaction: Written 1906. Russell developed a 'multiple relation theory of judgement'. But if a judgement is an assessment of truth or falsehood, what is it that is being assessed?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

4785	Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
	A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation

8408	Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
	A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.