Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley' and 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

23025	Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell]
	Full Idea: The progress of philosophy seems to demand that, like science, it should learn to practise induction, to test its premisses by the conclusions to which they lead, and not merely by their apparent self-evidence.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley [1899], nr end)
	A reaction: [from Twitter] Love this. It is 'one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens'. I think all philosophical conclusions, without exception, should be reached by evaluating the final result fully, and not just following a line of argument.

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity

9355	One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
	Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
	From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
	A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

19508	Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge.

19509	The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.