Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Inventing Logical Necessity' and 'Neutral Relations'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity

9355	One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
	Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
	From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
	A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

14217	The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The 'standard' view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, is that we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order (which works for examples like 'loves' and 'between').
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
	A reaction: The point of Fine's paper is that there are many relations for which this model seems to fail.

14216	The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved']
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
	A reaction: Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places.

14218	A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata?
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
	A reaction: He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation.

14219	Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Roads in the directional sense (A-to-B or B-to-A) are merely roads in the adirectional sense up which a direction has been imposed.
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
	A reaction: This is Fine's linguistic objection to the standard view of relations. It is undeniable that language imposes an order where it may not exist ('Bob and Jane play tennis'), and this fact is very significant in discussing relations.

14220	Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: A 'biased' relation can be taken to be the result of imposing ordering on the argument-places of an unbiased relation, ..or we can take an unbiased relation to be a 'permutation class' of biased relations. This is a familiar metaphysic predicament.
	From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 3)
	A reaction: 'Biased' relations such as 'on top of' have an ordering to their places, but 'unbiased' relations such as 'vertical placement' do not. This is a nice question in the metaphysics of grounding relations between key concepts.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12189	Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
	Full Idea: Wright espouses a non-realist, indeed non-cognitive account of logical necessity. Crucial to this is the idea that acceptance of a statement as necessary always involves an element of decision (to use it in a necessary way).
	From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §3
	A reaction: This has little appeal to me, as I take (unfashionably) the view that that logical necessity is rooted in the behaviour of the actual physical world, with which you can't argue. We test simple logic by making up examples.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

7320	Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]
	Full Idea: Crispin Wright has argued that Quine's holism is implausible because it is actually incoherent: he claims that Quine's holism cannot provide us with a coherent account of scientific methodology.
	From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.5
	A reaction: This sounds promising, given my intuitive aversion to linguistic holism, and almost everything to do with Quine. Scientific methodology is not isolated, but spreads into our ordinary (experimental) interactions with the world (e.g. Idea 2461).