37 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: A statement expressing a real definition must also accomplish more than simply to offer two different ways of singling out the same entity, since the definiens must also be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: This is why Aristotelian definitions are not just short lexicographical definitions, but may be quite length. Effectively, a definition IS an explanation. |
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument. | |
| From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2 | |
| A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team. |
| 15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Fand P as 'will' and 'was', G as 'always going to be', H as 'always has been', all tenses reduce to 14 cases: the past series, each implying the next, FH,H,PH,HP,P,GP, and the future series PG,G,FG,GF,F,HF, plus GH=HG implying all, FP=PF which all imply. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.8) | |
| A reaction: I have tried to translate the fourteen into English, but am not quite confident enough to publish them here. I leave it as an exercise for the reader. |
| 15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: In temporal logic, if the converse Barcan formula holds then nothing goes out of existence, and the direct Barcan formula holds if nothing ever comes into existence. These results highlight the intuitive absurdity of the Barcan formulas. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
| A reaction: This is my reaction to the modal cases as well - the absurdity of thinking that no actually nonexistent thing might possibly have existed, or that the actual existents might not have existed. Williamson seems to be the biggest friend of the formulas. |
| 15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: From one point of view intuitionistic logic is a part of classical logic, missing one axiom, from another classical logic is a part of intuitionistic logic, missing two connectives, intuitionistic v and → | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.4) |
| 15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: The question of the completeness of the full intuitionistic logic for its intended interpretation is not yet fully resolved. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.9) |
| 15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: The relevantist logician's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason'. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.8) |
| 15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Among the more technically oriented a 'logic' no longer means a theory about which forms of argument are valid, but rather means any formalism, regardless of its applications, that resembles original logic enough to be studied by similar methods. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
| A reaction: There doesn't seem to be any great intellectual obligation to be 'technical'. As far as pure logic is concerned, I am very drawn to the computer approach, since I take that to be the original dream of Aristotle and Leibniz - impersonal precision. |
| 15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: There are topics of great philosophical interest that classical logic neglects because they are not important to mathematics. …These include distinctions of past, present and future, or of necessary, actual and possible. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.1) |
| 15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: The Cut rule (from A|-B and B|-C, infer A|-C) directly expresses the classical doctrine that entailment is transitive. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
| 15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Classical logic neglects counterfactual conditionals for the same reason it neglects temporal and modal distinctions, namely, that they play no serious role in mathematics. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: Science obviously needs counterfactuals, and metaphysics needs modality. Maybe so-called 'classical' logic will be renamed 'basic mathematical logic'. Philosophy will become a lot clearer when that happens. |
| 15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, a technical subject. …Its centre of gravity today lies in theoretical computer science. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
| A reaction: He firmly distinguishes it from 'philosophy of logic', but doesn't spell it out. I take it that philosophical logic concerns metaprinciples which compare logical systems, and suggest new lines of research. Philosophy of logic seems more like metaphysics. |
| 15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: When formalising arguments it is convenient to have as many connectives as possible available.; but when proving results about formulas it is convenient to have as few as possible. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. The fact that you can whittle classical logic down to two (or even fewer!) connectives warms the heart of technicians, but makes connection to real life much more difficult. Hence a bunch of extras get added. |
| 15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Gricean implicature theory might suggest that a disjunction is never assertable when a disjunct is (though actually the disjunction might be 'pertinent') - but the procedure is indispensable in mathematical practice. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: He gives an example of a proof in maths which needs it, and an unusual conversational occasion where it makes sense. |
| 15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.7) |
| 15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: By contrast to rigidly designating proper names, …the denotation of definite descriptions is (in general) not rigid but flexible. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
| A reaction: This modern way of putting it greatly clarifies why Russell was interested in the type of reference involved in definite descriptions. Obviously some descriptions (such as 'the only person who could ever have…') might be rigid. |
| 15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: There are atomic formulas, and formulas built from the connectives, and that is all. We show that all formulas have some property, first for the atomics, then the others. This proof is 'induction on complexity'; we also use 'recursion on complexity'. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: That is: 'induction on complexity' builds a proof from atomics, via connectives; 'recursion on complexity' breaks down to the atomics, also via the connectives. You prove something by showing it is rooted in simple truths. |
| 15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: It might be wondered how one could have any kind of proof procedure at all if transitivity of entailment is disallowed, but the sequent calculus can get around the difficulty. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: He gives examples where transitivity of entailment (so that you can build endless chains of deductions) might fail. This is the point of the 'cut free' version of sequent calculus, since the cut rule allows transitivity. |
| 15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Instead of demonstrations which are either axioms, or follow from axioms by rules, we can have one ever-growing sequence of formulas of the form 'Axioms |- ______', where the blank is filled by Axioms, then Lemmas, then Theorems, then Corollaries. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
| 15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: The valid formulas of classical sentential logic are called 'tautologically valid', or simply 'tautologies'; with other logics 'tautologies' are formulas that are substitution instances of valid formulas of classical sentential logic. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.5) |
| 15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Validity (truth by virtue of logical form alone) and demonstrability (provability by virtue of logical form alone) have correlative notions of logical possibility, 'satisfiability' and 'consistency', which come apart in some logics. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) |
| 15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Models generally deliberately leave out meaning, retaining only what is important for the determination of truth values. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the key point to hang on to, if you are to avoid confusing mathematical models with models of things in the real world. |
| 15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: In practice there is no need to consider any but mathematical models, models whose universes consist of mathematical objects, since every model is isomorphic to one of these. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: The crucial link is the technique of Gödel Numbering, which can translate any verbal formula into numerical form. He adds that, because of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem only subsets of the natural numbers need be considered. |
| 15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: The aim in setting up a model theory is that the technical notion of truth in all models should agree with the intuitive notion of truth in all instances. A model is supposed to represent everything about an instance that matters for its truth. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.2) |
| 15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false). | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7) | |
| A reaction: The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once? |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Being the successor of the successor of 0 is more explanatory than being predecessor of 3 of the nature of 2, since it mirrors more closely the method by which 2 is constructed from a basic entity, 0, and a relation (successor) taken as primitive. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: This assumes numbers are 'constructed', which they are in the axiomatised system of Peano Arithmetic, but presumably the numbers were given in ordinary experience before 'construction' occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, I really like this. |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here. |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: According to the approach of Plantinga, Forbes and Mackie, the primary job of essences is to individuate the entities whose essences they are across worlds and times at which these entities exist. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4 n13) | |
| A reaction: A helpful simplification of what is going on. I wish those authors would just say this one their first pages. They all get in a right tangle, because individuation is either too easy, or hopeless. 'Tracking' is a good word for this game. |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions! |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: To make room for a less propositional conception of essence than that assumed by Fine, I urge that we distinguish more firmly between essences and real definitions (which state these essences in the form of propositions). | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: Yes. The idea that essence is just a verbal or conceptual entity would be utterly abhorrent to Aristotle (a hero for Fine), and it is anathema to me too. We intend essences to be in the world (even if we are deceived about that). They explain! |
| 15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: There is a problem over 'de re' modality (as contrasted with 'de dicto'), as in ∃x□x. What is meant by '"it is analytic that Px" is satisfied by a', given that analyticity is a notion that in the first instance applies to complete sentences? | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.9) | |
| A reaction: This is Burgess's summary of one of Quine's original objections. The issue may be a distinction between whether the sentence is analytic, and what makes it analytic. The necessity of bachelors being unmarried makes that sentence analytic. |
| 15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that there is any conventional wisdom about the question, it is that S5 is correct for alethic logical modality, and S4 correct for apodictic logical modality. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.8) | |
| A reaction: In classical logic these coincide, so presumably one should use the minimum system to do the job, which is S4 (?). |
| 15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Logical necessity is a genus with two species. For classical logic the truth-related notion of validity and the proof-related notion of demonstrability, coincide - but they are distinct concept. In some logics they come apart, in intension and extension. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: They coincide in classical logic because it is sound and complete. This strikes me as the correct approach to logical necessity, tying it to the actual nature of logic, rather than some handwavy notion of just 'true in all possible worlds'. |
| 15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Three main theories of the truth of indicative conditionals are Materialism (the conditions are the same as for the material conditional), Idealism (identifying assertability with truth-value), and Nihilism (no truth, just assertability). | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.3) |
| 15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: It is contentious whether conditionals have negations, and whether 'it is not the case that if A,B' has any clear meaning. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.9) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be connected to Lewis's proof that a probability conditional cannot be reduced to a single proposition. If a conditional only applies to A-worlds, it is not surprising that its meaning gets lost when it leaves that world. |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: It is plausible to think that an explanation, when successful, captures or represents (by argument, or a why? question) an underlying real-world relation of dependence which obtains among the phenomena cited. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: She cites causal dependence as an example. I'm incline to think that 'grounding' is a better word for the target of good explanations than is 'dependence' (which can, surely, be mutual, where ground has the directionality needed for explanation). |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: In 'feature dependence', the ontologically dependent entity may be thought of as the result of a process of abstraction which takes the 'bearer' as its starting point and arrives at the abstracted entity by blocking out all the irrelevant features. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: She seems unaware that this is traditional abstraction, found in Aristotle, and a commonplace of thought until Frege got his evil hands on abstraction and stole it for other purposes. I'm a fan. |