3 ideas
9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2 | |
A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team. |
8972 | What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Nothing in the world of nominalistically acceptable things could ground or explain the non-identity of the set {A,{A,B}} with the set {B,{A,B}}. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions [2003], p.154) | |
A reaction: [He cites Goodman for this thought] Van Inwagen is offering this to show that the existence of sets is abstract, whereas Goodman was denying the existence of sets altogether. I'm with Goodman. Nice example. |
21338 | I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine] |
Full Idea: I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning; for the cleavage between meaning and fact is part of what ...I am questioning. | |
From: Willard Quine (Letters [1962], 1962.06.01) | |
A reaction: [Letter to Adolf Grünbaum. Found on Twitter] A strikingly helpful expression of his position by Quine. We should take about the 'meaning/fact distinction' in order to understand clearly what is going on here. |