Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Letter to Weber' and 'Instrospection'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
     Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
     From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
     A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
     Full Idea: Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power.
     From: Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4
     A reaction: Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
     Full Idea: Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
     From: David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
     A reaction: This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.