Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Letter to Weber' and 'De primae philosophiae emendatione'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
     Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
     From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
     A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
     Full Idea: Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power.
     From: Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4
     A reaction: Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The concept of forces or powers ..for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De primae philosophiae emendatione [1694], G IV 469), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: My own experience was that as soon as I encountered the notion of a 'power' in the metaphysics of science (see Molnar on this) the whole thing began to form a coherent picture. Powers rule.