12 ideas
23881 | All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil] |
Full Idea: All reflections bearing on the notion of value and on the hierarchy of values is philosophical; all efforts of thought bearing on anything other than value are, if one examines them closely, foreign to philosophy. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.30) | |
A reaction: If nothing else proves that Weil is a platonist, this does. She, of course, has a transcendent and religious view of values, whereas I just see them as concepts which embody what is important. That said, I'm not far off agreeing with this. |
23885 | Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil] |
Full Idea: Philosophy does not consist in accumulating knowledge, as science does, but in changing the whole soul. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.33) | |
A reaction: I agree, roughly. In the sense that philosophy is a much more personal matter than any pure pursuit of knowledge, such as geology. Though a life in geology could change your soul. Not just any old change, of course…. |
23886 | Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil] |
Full Idea: People believe that every philosopher has a system that contradicts all the others! But there is a tradition, genuinely philosophical, that is as old as humanity itself. …Plato is the most perfect representative of this tradition. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.33) | |
A reaction: I see roughly two traditions. If you believe in transcendence you follow Plato, like Simone. If you are a naturalist (like me) you follow Aristotle. A third tradition might be much more sceptical. |
9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2 | |
A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team. |
23884 | Truth is a value of thought [Weil] |
Full Idea: Truth is a value of thought. The word 'truth' cannot have any other meaning. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.32) | |
A reaction: This makes a nice change from truth being a mere predicate. I would call truth the criterion of success in thought, and that counts as a value, so she is right. |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74) | |
A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that. |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8) | |
A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification? |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a) | |
A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation. |
23882 | Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil] |
Full Idea: Everything that can be taken as an end cannot be defined. Means, such as power and money, are easily defined, and that is why people orient themselves exclusively towards the acquisition of means. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.31) | |
A reaction: Nice, but too neat, because so many activities can be treated either as means or as ends, and often as both. It makes sense that people pursue what is clear to them. |
23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |
Full Idea: For the mind essentially and always, in whatever manner it is disposed, strives towards value. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.31) | |
A reaction: A typically platonist thought. If you accept my view that values identify what is important, the thought is plausible. We might distinguish between what the mind pointlessly entertains, and what it 'strives' for. |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158) | |
A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism. |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95) |