10 ideas
9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2 | |
A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team. |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that. |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds. |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: Infallibility does not follow from indefeasibility. | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance') | |
A reaction: If very little evidence exists then this could clearly be the case. It is especially true of historical and archaeological evidence. |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: Can the original justification of a belief be regained through a successful defeat of a defeater? | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeater-Defs') | |
A reaction: [Jäger 2005 addresses this] I would have thought the answer is yes. I aspire to coherent justifications, so I don't see justifications as a chain of defeat and counter-defeat, but as collective groups of support and challenge. |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: An unmodified reliabilism does not accommodate defeaters, and surely there can be defeaters against reliably produced beliefs? | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeaters') | |
A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1980] Reliabilism has plenty of problems anyway, since a generally reliable process can obviously occasionally produce a bad result. 20:20 vision is not perfect vision. Internalist seem to like defeaters. |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: There are 'rebutting' defeaters against the truth of a previously justified belief, 'undercutting' defeaters against the power of the evidence, and 'reason-defeating' defeaters against the truth of the reason for the belief. | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'How') | |
A reaction: That is (I think) that you can defeat the background, the likelihood, or the truth. He cites Pollock 1986, and implies that these are standard distinctions about defeaters. |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: Advocates of the defeasibility theory have tried to exclude true pieces of information that are misleading defeaters. | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What') | |
A reaction: He gives as an example the genuine news of a claim that the suspect has a twin. |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: The 'defeasibility theory' of knowledge claims that knowledge is only present if there are no facts that - if they were known - would be genuine defeaters of the relevant justification. | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What') | |
A reaction: Something not right here. A genuine defeater would ensure the proposition was false, so it would simply fail the truth test. So we need a 'defeater' for a truth, which must therefore by definition be misleading. Many qualifications have to be invoked. |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
Full Idea: Theories that combine basic justification with the defeasibility of this justification are referred to as 'moderate' foundationalism. | |
From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance') | |
A reaction: I could be more sympathetic to this sort of foundationalism. But it begins to sound more like Neurath's boat (see Quine) than like Descartes' metaphor of building foundations. |