Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Hat-Tricks and Heaps' and 'The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
     Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument.
     From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2
     A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
The smallest heap has four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top [Hart,WD, by Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Hart argues that the smallest heap consists of four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top.
     From: report of William D. Hart (Hat-Tricks and Heaps [1992]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction Intro
     A reaction: If the objects were rough bolders, you could get away with two on the bottom. He's wrong. No one would accept as a 'heap' four minute grains barely visible to the naked eye. No one would describe such a group of items in a supermarket as a heap.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Kant showed that our perceptions are partly constructed from our concepts [Reichenbach]
     Full Idea: It was Kant's great discovery that the object of knowledge is not simply given but constructed, and that it contains conceptual elements not contained in pure perception.
     From: Hans Reichenbach (The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge [1965], p.49), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap