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All the ideas for 'A Discourse on Method', 'Politics' and 'Thinking About Logic'

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179 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3600 Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Those who go forward only very slowly can progress much further if they always keep to the right path, than those who run and wander off it.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §1.2)
     A reaction: Like Descartes' 'Method'. This seems to place a low value on 'nous' or intuition.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
2845 Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01)
     A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
3601 Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Looking at the various activities and enterprises of mankind with the eye of a philosopher, there is hardly one which does not seem to me vain and useless.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §1.3)
     A reaction: Well, yes. The obvious retort is that everything is vain and useless; or if not, then certainly metaphysics is. Useful for what? Is ornamental gardening useless, or sport? Art? What is the use of cosmology? He's right, of course.
3602 Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
     Full Idea: There is nothing one can imagine so strange or so unbelievable that has not been said by one or other of the philosophers.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §2.16)
     A reaction: Actually I think that extensive areas of logical possibilities for existence remain totally unexplored. On the other hand, most of the metaphysical beliefs of most of the human race, including the majority of philosophers, strike me as being false.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
22521 Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18)
     A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
1570 Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09)
     A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
1574 Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12)
     A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states.
3603 Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
     Full Idea: Descartes' four principles for his method of thinking are: be cautious, analyse the problem, be systematic from simple to complex, and keep an overview of the problem
     From: report of René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §2.18) by PG - Db (ideas)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
2801 Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30)
     A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
22529 Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01)
     A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
3612 Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
     Full Idea: That the things we grasp very clearly and very distinctly are all true, is assured only because God is or exists, and because he is a perfect Being.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.38)
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
22571 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36)
     A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
3610 Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I take it as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is merely some difficulty in properly discerning which are those which we distinctly conceive.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.33)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
10987 Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
     Full Idea: Three traditional names for rules are 'Simplification' (P from 'P and Q'), 'Addition' ('P or Q' from P), and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' (Q from 'P or Q' and 'not-P').
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
11004 Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
     Full Idea: In S4 necessity is said to be informal 'provability', and in S5 it is said to be 'true in every possible world'.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: It seems that the S4 version is proof-theoretic, and the S5 version is semantic.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
11018 There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
     Full Idea: In fuzzy logic, besides fuzzy predicates, which define fuzzy sets, there are also fuzzy quantifiers (such as 'most' and 'few') and fuzzy modifiers (such as 'usually').
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
11011 Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
     Full Idea: It is normal to classify free logics into three sorts; positive free logics (some propositions with empty terms are true), negative free logics (they are false), and neuter free logics (they lack truth-value), though I find this unhelpful and superficial.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
11020 Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
     Full Idea: Hard-headed realism tends to embrace the full Comprehension Principle, that every well-defined concept determines a set.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This sort of thing gets you into trouble with Russell's paradox (though that is presumably meant to be excluded somehow by 'well-defined'). There are lots of diluted Comprehension Principles.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10986 Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
     Full Idea: We must recognise that first-order classical logic is inadequate to describe all valid consequences, that is, all cases in which it is impossible for the premisses to be true and the conclusion false.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is despite the fact that first-order logic is 'complete', in the sense that its own truths are all provable.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
10972 The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
     Full Idea: The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
11024 Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
     Full Idea: For the realist, study of semantic structures comes before study of proofs. In higher-order logic is has to, for the logics are incomplete.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.9)
     A reaction: This seems to be an important general observation about any incomplete system, such as Peano arithmetic. You may dream the old rationalist dream of starting from the beginning and proving everything, but you can't. Start with truth and meaning.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
10985 We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
     Full Idea: Those who believe mathematics goes beyond logic use that fact to argue that classical logic is right to exclude second-order logic.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
10970 A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
     Full Idea: A theory of logical consequence, while requiring a conceptual analysis of consequence, also searches for a set of techniques to determine the validity of particular arguments.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
10984 Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
     Full Idea: If classical logic insists that logical consequence is just a matter of the form, we fail to include as valid consequences those inferences whose correctness depends on the connections between non-logical terms (such as 'round' and 'square').
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: He suggests that an inference such as 'round, so not square' should be labelled as 'materially valid'.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
10973 A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
     Full Idea: A 'theory' is any logically closed set of propositions, ..and since any proposition has infinitely many consequences, including all the logical truths, so that theories have infinitely many premisses.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Read is introducing this as the essential preliminary to an account of the Compactness Theorem, which relates these infinite premisses to the finite.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11007 Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
     Full Idea: Quantifiers are second-order predicates.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
     A reaction: [He calls this 'Frege's insight'] They seem to be second-order in Tarski's sense, that they are part of a metalanguage about the sentence, rather than being a part of the sentence.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10978 In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
     Full Idea: The defining factor of second-order logic is that, while the domain of its individual variables may be arbitrary, the range of the first-order variables is all the properties of the objects in its domain (or, thinking extensionally, of the sets objects).
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The key point is that the domain is 'all' of the properties. How many properties does an object have. You need to decide whether you believe in sparse or abundant properties (I vote for very sparse indeed).
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10971 A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
     Full Idea: Logical truth is a degenerate, or extreme, case of consequence. A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses, or a proposition in the premisses of an argument which is unnecessary or may be suppressed.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10988 Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
     Full Idea: Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate because of the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski property, and the consequent Skolem paradox.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The limitation is in giving an account of infinities.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10974 Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
     Full Idea: Classical logical consequence is compact, which means that any consequence of an infinite set of propositions (such as a theory) is a consequence of some finite subset of them.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
10975 Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
     Full Idea: Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses. It can; but classically, it is valid if and only if the conclusion follows from a finite subset of them.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
10977 Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
     Full Idea: Compact consequence undergenerates - there are intuitively valid consequences which it marks as invalid, such as the ω-rule, that if A holds of the natural numbers, then 'for every n, A(n)', but the proof of that would be infinite, for each number.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
10976 Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
     Full Idea: Compactness is a virtue - it makes the consequence relation more manageable; but it is also a limitation - it limits the expressive power of the logic.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The major limitation is that wholly infinite proofs are not permitted, as in Idea 10977.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
11014 Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
     Full Idea: It cannot be self-reference alone that is at fault. Rather, what seems to cause the problems in the paradoxes is the combination of self-reference with falsity.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.6)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
11025 Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
     Full Idea: Every potential infinity seems to suggest an actual infinity - e.g. generating successors suggests they are really all there already; cutting the line suggests that the point where the cut is made is already in place.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Finding a new gambit in chess suggests it was there waiting for us, but we obviously invented chess. Daft.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10979 Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
     Full Idea: Second-order arithmetic is categorical - indeed, there is a single formula of second-order logic whose only model is the standard model ω, consisting of just the natural numbers, with all of arithmetic following. It is nevertheless incomplete.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is the main reason why second-order logic has a big fan club, despite the logic being incomplete (as well as the arithmetic).
10980 Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
     Full Idea: Second-order arithmetic can rule out the non-standard models (with non-standard numbers). Its induction axiom crucially refers to 'any' property, which gives the needed categoricity for the models.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
10997 Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
     Full Idea: The Von Neumann numbers have a structural isomorphism to the natural numbers - each number is the set of all its predecessors, so 2 is the set of 0 and 1. This helps proofs, but is unacceptable. 2 is not a set with two members, or a member of 3.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
11016 Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
     Full Idea: We must ask whether a language without vagueness would be usable at all.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Popper makes a similar remark somewhere, with which I heartily agreed. This is the idea of 'spreading the word' over the world, which seems the right way of understanding it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
11019 Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
     Full Idea: The supervaluation approach to vagueness is to construe vague predicates not as ones with fuzzy borderlines and no cut-off, but as having a cut-off somewhere, but in no particular place.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Presumably you narrow down the gap by supervaluation, then split the difference to get a definite value.
11012 A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
     Full Idea: A 'supervaluation' says a proposition is true if it is true in all classical extensions of the original partial valuation. Thus 'A or not-A' has no valuation for an empty name, but if 'extended' to make A true or not-true, not-A always has opposite value.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
11013 Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
     Full Idea: In supervaluations, the Law of Identity has no value for empty names, and remains so if extended. The Indiscernibility of Identicals also fails if extending it for non-denoting terms, where Fa comes out true and Fb false.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
10995 A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
     Full Idea: The haecceitist (a neologism coined by Duns Scotus, pronounced 'hex-ee-it-ist', meaning literally 'thisness') believes that each thing has an individual essence, a set of properties which are essential to it.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be a difference of opinion over whether a haecceity is a set of essential properties, or a bare particular. The key point is that it is unique to each entity.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
22525 The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same).
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20)
     A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11001 Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
     Full Idea: The equation of 'necessity' with 'true in every possible world' is known as the S5 conception, corresponding to the strongest of C.I.Lewis's five modal systems.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Are the worlds naturally, or metaphysically, or logically possible?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
10992 The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
     Full Idea: The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: [He attributes this idea to Frank Jackson] This makes the point, against Grice, that the implication of conditionals is not conversational but a matter of logical convention. See Idea 21396 for a very different view.
10989 The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
     Full Idea: The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional, that is, that their truth-values are determined by the truth-values of their constituents.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3)
11017 Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
     Full Idea: Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: See Idea 14283, where this appears to have been 'proved' by Lewis, and is not just a view held by some people.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
10983 Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
     Full Idea: The modal Platonist denies that knowledge always depends on a causal relation. The reality of possible worlds is an ontological requirement, to secure the truth-values of modal propositions.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: [Reply to Idea 10982] This seems to be a case of deriving your metaphyics from your semantics, of which David Lewis seems to be guilty, and which strikes me as misguided.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
10982 How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
     Full Idea: If modal Platonism was true, how could we ever know the truth of a modal proposition?
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I take this to be very important. Our knowledge of modal truths must depend on our knowledge of the actual world. The best answer seems to involve reference to the 'powers' of the actual world. A reply is in Idea 10983.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
10996 Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
     Full Idea: There are two main forms of actualism: reductionism, which seeks to construct possible worlds out of some more mundane material; and moderate realism, in which the actual concrete world is contrasted with abstract, but none the less real, possible worlds.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: I am a reductionist, as I do not take abstractions to be 'real' (precisely because they have been 'abstracted' from the things that are real). I think I will call myself a 'scientific modalist' - we build worlds from possibilities, discovered by science.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
10981 A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
     Full Idea: A possible world is a complete determination of the truth-values of all propositions over a certain domain.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Even if the domain is very small? Even if the world fitted the logic nicely, but was naturally impossible?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11000 If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
     Full Idea: If each possible world constitutes a concrete reality, then no object can be present in more than one world - objects may have 'counterparts', but cannot be identical with them.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This explains clearly why in Lewis's modal realist scheme he needs counterparts instead of rigid designation. Sounds like a slippery slope. If you say 'Humphrey might have won the election', who are you talking about?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
22587 Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16)
     A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3605 We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The action of thought by which one believes a thing, being different from that by which one knows that one believes it, they often exist the one without the other.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §3.23)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
1583 In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
     Full Idea: Descartes' procedure for treating values (accepting normal conventions when faced with uncertainty) is the exact antithesis of that used to attain knowledge.
     From: comment on René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §3.23) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.73
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3607 In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
     Full Idea: While I decided to think that everything was false, it followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; the truth 'I think therefore I am' was so certain that the most extravagant scepticism could never shake it.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.32)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
3617 I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I have tried to find in general the principles or first causes of everything which is or which may be in the world, ..without taking them from any other source than from certain seeds of truth which are naturally in our minds.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §6.64)
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3611 Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Neither our imagination nor our senses could ever assure us of anything, if our understanding did not intervene.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.37)
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3606 I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
     Full Idea: My whole plan had for its aim simply to give me assurance, and the rejection of shifting ground and sand in order to find rock or clay.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §3.29)
     A reaction: I take this to be characteristic of an age when religion is being quietly rocked by the revival of ancient scepticism. If he'd settled for fallibilism, our civilization would have gone differently.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3604 When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Before beginning to rebuild the house in which one lives…. one must also provide oneself with some other accommodation in which to be lodge conveniently while the work is going on.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §3.22)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
3618 Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I observe almost no individual effect without immediately knowing that it can be deduced in many different ways, ..and I know of no way to resolve this but by experiments such that the results are different according to different explanations.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §6.65)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
22522 To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24)
     A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
22524 The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32)
     A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
3615 Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Animals not only have less reason than men, but they have none at all; for we see that very little of it is required in order to be able to speak.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §5.58)
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10998 The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
     Full Idea: Ways things might be are real, but only when abstracted from the actual way things are. They are brought out and distinguished by the mind, by abstraction, but are not dependent on mind for their existence.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: To me this just flatly contradicts itself. The idea that the mind can 'bring something out' by its operations, with the result being then accepted as part of reality is nonsense on stilts. What is real is the powers that make the possibilities.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
3609 I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.33)
     A reaction: To me that sounds like "I concluded that I wasn't a human being", which highlights the bizarre wishful thinking that seems to have gripped the human race for the first few thousand years of its serious thinking.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22528 The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28)
     A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
3608 I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I could pretend that I had no body, and that there was no world or place that I was in, but I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.32)
     A reaction: He makes the (in my opinion) appalling blunder of thinking that because he can pretend that he has no body, that therefore he might not have one. I can pretend that gold is an unusual form of cheese. However, "I don't exist" certainly sounds wrong.
3613 Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Whereas reason is a universal instrument which can serve on any kind of occasion, the organs of a machine need a disposition for each action; so it is impossible to have enough different organs in a machine to respond to all the occurrences of life.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §5.57)
     A reaction: How can Descartes know that reason is 'universal' rather than just 'very extensive'? Is there any information which cannot be encoded in a computer? It doesn't feel as if there any intrinsic restrictions to reason, but note Idea 4688.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3616 The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is not sufficient that the reasonable soul should be lodged in the body like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its limbs, but it needs to be united more closely with the body in order to have sensations and appetites, and so be a true man.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §5.59)
     A reaction: The idea that the pineal gland is the link suggests that Descartes has the 'pilot' view, but this idea shows that he believes in very close and complex interaction between mind and body. But how can a mind 'have' appetites if it has no physical needs?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
3614 A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
     Full Idea: One may conceive of a machine made so as to emit words, and even emit them in response to a change in its bodily organs, such as being touched, but not to reply to the sense of everything said in its presence, as the most unintelligent men can.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §5.56)
     A reaction: A critique of the Turing Test, written in 1637! You have to admire. Because of the advent of the microprocessor, we can 'conceive' more sophisticated, multi-level machines than Descartes could come up with.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
11005 Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
     Full Idea: A problem with compositionality is negative existential propositions. If some of the terms of the proposition are empty, and don't refer, then compositionality implies that the whole will lack meaning too.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
     A reaction: I don't agree. I don't see why compositionality implies holism about sentence-meaning. If I say 'that circular square is a psychopath', you understand the predication, despite being puzzled by the singular term.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
10966 A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
     Full Idea: A proposition makes an object out of what is said or expressed by the utterance of a certain sort of sentence, namely, one in the indicative mood which makes sense and doesn't fail in its references. It can then be an object of thought and belief.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Nice, but two objections: I take it to be crucial to propositions that they eliminate ambiguities, and I take it that animals are capable of forming propositions. Read seems to regard them as fictions, but I take them to be brain events.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
22570 Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12)
     A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
22574 A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17)
     A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
2837 Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09)
     A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
2824 The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08)
     A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
2846 Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type).
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20)
     A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
2807 Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20)
     A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22582 Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen].
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39)
     A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
2810 Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03)
     A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22555 The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10)
     A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
1581 Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The ancient pagans place virtues on a high plateau and make them appear the most valuable thing in the world, but they do not sufficiently instruct us about how to know them.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §1.8)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22557 Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38)
     A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person.
2841 People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38)
     A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
2829 The law is the mean [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The law is the mean.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04)
     A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
22590 Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14)
     A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
2813 It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32)
     A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
22553 Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38)
     A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
22561 The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
2808 Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12)
     A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2803 Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01)
     A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human.
2820 People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20)
     A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human.
22586 Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The human being alone has reason.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04)
     A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
22523 The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27)
     A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists.
2805 A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17)
     A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration.
22526 People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27)
     A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient.
22535 Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07)
     A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?).
22532 A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14)
     A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse.
22584 A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27)
     A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains?
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
22581 The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23)
     A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
22548 A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38)
     A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities?
22577 What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19)
     A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in.
22579 The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33)
     A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader.
2431 Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01)
     A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure.
22578 The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29)
     A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
2832 The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25)
     A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
2821 The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy).
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04)
     A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'.
22546 A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17)
     A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values.
2835 Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35)
     A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable.
22580 The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23)
     A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity….
22558 Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15)
     A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population.
22566 The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10)
     A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law.
2973 We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14)
     A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
22563 The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12)
     A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices.
2818 The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28)
     A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function.
22545 A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33)
     A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39).
22544 A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18)
     A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
22541 Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20)
     A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
2819 The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27)
     A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not.
22542 People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01)
     A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure.
22552 The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32)
     A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point.
22583 The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07)
     A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
22543 In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11)
     A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard.
22539 Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25)
     A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics.
22572 Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33)
     A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
2826 Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30)
     A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity.
22567 Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28)
     A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom.
22560 Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07)
     A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes.
22562 Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07)
     A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short.
2823 The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01)
     A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
22533 If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38)
     A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible.
2817 It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10)
     A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back.
22576 No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42)
     A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
22549 In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18)
     A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
22575 Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05)
     A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
22531 We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
22564 Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24)
     A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships.
22585 Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22)
     A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants.
22565 The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34)
     A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'?
22589 Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27)
     A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
22534 People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33)
     A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
22538 Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23)
     A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'.
22536 There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02)
     A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
22530 Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14)
     A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
21358 Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099
     A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists?
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
20092 One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1)
     A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
2833 Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27)
     A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children).
2834 It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05)
     A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them.
2830 We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11)
     A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
22569 The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14)
     A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities.
22550 It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28)
     A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen.
22568 Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30)
     A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
2814 Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38)
     A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter.
22540 Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02)
     A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
2828 Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31)
     A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
22537 Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38)
     A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
22573 The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37)
     A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony?
2825 The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17)
     A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment.
22527 Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36)
     A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community.
22547 Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11)
     A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
2816 If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23)
     A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results.
2806 Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31)
     A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this.
22556 Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05)
     A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
22554 It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10)
     A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application.
2827 It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19)
     A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela.
22551 Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01)
     A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
2840 The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08)
     A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
2811 A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33)
     A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity.
22588 A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21)
     A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good.
2847 The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30)
     A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
2842 Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10)
     A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
2844 Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24)
     A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
2809 If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20)
     A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
2800 The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03)
     A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
16686 God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I have noticed certain laws that God has so established in nature, and of which he has implanted such notions in our souls, that …we cannot doubt that they are exactly observed in everything that exists or occurs in the world.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], pt 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5
     A reaction: This is the view of laws which still seems to be with us (and needs extirpating) - that some outside agency imposes them on nature. I suspect that even Richard Feynman thought of laws like that, because he despised philosophy, and was thus naïve.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
2836 God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24)
     A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
2802 Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26)
     A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets.