5784
|
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
|
|
A reaction:
I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
|
5783
|
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
|
|
A reaction:
An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
|
10009
|
Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
|
|
Full Idea:
In a famous paper, Wallace argued that all interpretations of quantifiers (including the substitutional interpretation) are, in the end, variants of that proposed by Tarski (in 1936).
|
|
From:
report of Wallace, J (On the Frame of Reference [1970]) by Thomas Baldwin - Interpretations of Quantifiers
|
|
A reaction:
A significant-looking pointer. We must look elsewhere for Tarski's account, which will presumably subsume the objectual interpretation as well. The ontology of Tarski's account of truth is an enduring controversy.
|
16744
|
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
|
|
A reaction:
This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?
|
5016
|
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
|
|
A reaction:
Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.
|
16633
|
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
|
|
A reaction:
Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.
|
5780
|
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
|
5005
|
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07)
|
|
A reaction:
The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive.
|
5006
|
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09)
|
|
A reaction:
There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements.
|
5012
|
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49)
|
|
A reaction:
There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable.
|
5004
|
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
|
|
A reaction:
A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.
|
5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48)
|
|
A reaction:
This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality.
|
5778
|
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
|
|
A reaction:
Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
|
5018
|
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
|
|
A reaction:
If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.
|
5781
|
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
|
5782
|
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
|
|
A reaction:
This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
|
5008
|
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere?
|
15987
|
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
|
|
A reaction:
This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity.
|
16601
|
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5
|