17263
|
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
|
|
Full Idea:
What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
|
|
From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
|
17270
|
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
|
|
Full Idea:
We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
|
|
From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
|
|
A reaction:
I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
|
17267
|
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
|
|
From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
|
|
A reaction:
If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
|
3643
|
The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
|
|
A reaction:
A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.
|
19451
|
When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
|
|
Full Idea:
When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you?
|
|
From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
|
|
A reaction:
A delightful question, even if it looks like a false dichotomy. I'm not sure what to make of 'me', if my reason can be subtracted from it. Aquinas was one the same wavelength here.
|
19450
|
Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
|
|
Full Idea:
Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will.
|
|
From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
|
|
A reaction:
Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival.
|
19454
|
A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concept of God depends on the concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom - a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine.
|
|
From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
|
|
A reaction:
This is part of Feuerbach's argument for atheism, but if you ask for the source of our human concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom, no one, I would have thought, could cite God for the role.
|
19453
|
If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
|
|
Full Idea:
If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and ...their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God.
|
|
From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
|
|
A reaction:
It is certainly a struggle for the imagination to grasp a being which is characterised by idealised versions of human virtues, and yet has an intrinsic nature which is utterly different from humanity.
|