Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Fourth Objections', 'On the Natural Faculties' and 'Causation in a Physical World'

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6 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
     Full Idea: So long as we are ignorant of the true essence of the cause which is operating, we call it a 'faculty'.
     From: Galen (On the Natural Faculties [c.170], I.iv), quoted by Dominik Perler - Intro to The Faculties: a History 2
     A reaction: This is probably the view of most modern neuroscientists. I want to defend the idea that we need the concept of a faculty in philosophy, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists say it is too vague for their purposes.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
     A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
     A reaction: I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is not just that the earlier member of a cause-effect pair is conventionally called the cause; it is also connected with other temporal asymmetries that play an important role in our practices. We tend to explain later events in terms of earlier ones.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: We also interfere with the earlier one to affect the later one, and not vice versa (Idea 8363). I am inclined to think that attempting to explain the direction of causation is either pointless or hopeless.
The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
     From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
     A reaction: This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).