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21546
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We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
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A reaction:
Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.
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21545
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I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
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A reaction:
The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?
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3643
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The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
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From:
René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
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A reaction:
A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.
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