12 ideas
16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: The slogan for supervenience might be 'there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference'. …(qualifying as a 'perfect forgery' would be an example). | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: The key point about supervenience is that it is one-way. Presumably 'tracking' would be a better single word for it than 'dependence', which implies some sort of causal power. Supervenience describes, but doesn't attempt to explain. |
16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is neither symmetric nor asymmetric; it is non-symmetric. Sometimes it holds symmetrically. …And sometimes it holds asymmetrically. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.2) | |
A reaction: I think of supervenience as 'tracking'. Stalkers track victims; married couples track one another. Beauty tracks statues, but statues don't seem to track beauty. I take so-called mind-brain supervenience to be two-way, not one-way. |
16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Weak supervenience says there is no possible world that contains individuals that are B-indiscernible but A-discernible. Strong supervenience entails the same even if they are in different possible worlds. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §4.1) | |
A reaction: In other words (I presume), in simple language, the weak version says they happen supervene, the strong version says they have to supervene. |
16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: It has been claimed that aesthetic, moral and mental properties supervene upon physical properties, …and that modal truths supervene on non-modal ones, and that general truths supervene on particular ones. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: I am attracted to the last bit. I am bewildered by people who try to derive particular truths from general ones, such as deriving physical behaviour from laws, or the nature of some creature simply from its species. Only some tigers are man-eaters. |
16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Some entailments do not suffice for supervenience. Being a brother entails being a sibling, but being a sibling does not supervene on being a brother. Sarah has a sister and Jack in an only child. Sarah, unlike Jack, is a sibling; neither is a brother. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.2) | |
A reaction: The whole point of supervenience, I take it, is to label a relation of tracking, while offering no explanation of the tracking. Entailment would be a rather powerful explanation, as would a dog's being tied to a cart. |
16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Everyone agrees that reduction requires supervenience, …but the more interesting issue is whether supervenience suffices for reduction. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.3) | |
A reaction: I think we should assume that there is a reason for every genuine case of supervenience (i.e. there are no cases of eternal or ubiquitious coincidence). One-way causation seems to give supervenience without reduction. |
16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: All definitions of physicalism are compatible with the existence of a necessarily existing God. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], 5.4) | |
A reaction: All the definitions seem to depend on all the facts covarying with the physical facts, so anything which is invariant (such as divine or platonic entities) will stand outside the definition. Physicalism is more like a credo about all facts whatever. |
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity is just as strong as logical necessity in that the space of metaphysical possibility is exactly the same as the space of logical possibility: the logically possible worlds = the metaphysically possible worlds. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.1) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. To be the 'same strength' there would also have to be the same number of logical as metaphysical truths, and I presume that is not the case. There are far more logical than metaphysical possibilities. |
335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e) |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225) | |
A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious. |
336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a) | |
A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e) | |
A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |