45 ideas
7490 | Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson] |
Full Idea: As well as killing the need for God, Darwin's legacy transformed the idea of wisdom, as some definite attainable state, however far off. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.31) | |
A reaction: Where does this leave philosophy, if it is still (as I like to think) the love of wisdom? The best we can hope for is wisdom as a special sort of journey - touring, rather than arriving. |
7461 | The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson] |
Full Idea: The three key ideas that I have settled on in the history of ideas are: the soul, Europe, and the experiment. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: The soul is a nice choice (rather than God). 'Europe' seems rather vast and indeterminate to count as a key idea. |
7464 | The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson] |
Full Idea: Candidates for the most important idea in human history are: mimetic thinking (imitation), the soul, the experiment, the One True God, the heliocentric universe, and evolution. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.03) | |
A reaction: From this list I would choose the heliocentric universe, because it so dramatically downgraded the importance of our species (effectively we went from everything to nothing). We still haven't recovered from the shock. |
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The greatest good which can exist in a state is to have true philosophers. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref) | |
A reaction: …because they understand true reality, especially the Good. |
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
7465 | Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson] |
Full Idea: In Babylon thought seems to have worked mainly by analogy, rather than by the deductive or inductive processes we use in the modern world. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.04) | |
A reaction: Analogy seems to be closely related to induction, if it is comparing instances of something. Given their developments in maths and astronomy, they can't have been complete strangers to the 'modern' way of thought. |
7466 | Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson] |
Full Idea: To begin with, in Mesopotamia, counting systems applied to specific commodities (so the symbol for 'three sheep' applied only to sheep, and 'three cows' applied only to cows), but later words for abstract qualities emerged. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.04) | |
A reaction: It seems from this that we actually have a record of the discovery of true numbers. Delightful. I think the best way to describe what happened is that they began to spot patterns. |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
Full Idea: There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6 | |
A reaction: This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything? |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class. |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Universals arise solely from the fact that we avail ourselves of one idea in order to think of all individual things that have a certain similitude. When we understand under the same name all the objects represented by this idea, that name is universal. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59) | |
A reaction: Judging by the boldness of the pronouncement, it looks as if Descartes hasn't recognised the complexity of the problem. How do we spot a 'similarity', especially an abstraction like 'tool' or 'useful'? This sounds like Descartes trying to avoid Platonism. |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Based on perceiving the presence of some attribute, we conclude there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it can be attributed. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.52), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.1 | |
A reaction: A rainbow might be a tricky case. This illustrates the persistent belief in substances, even among philosophers who embraced the new corpuscular and mechanistic view of matter. |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
Full Idea: By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.51) | |
A reaction: Properties, of course, are the things which have dependent existence. Can properties be reduced to substances (e.g. by adopting a materialist theory of mind)? Note that Descartes does not think that substances depend on God for existence. |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3 | |
A reaction: Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'. |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
Full Idea: He who decides to doubt everything cannot nevertheless doubt that he exists while he doubts. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref) |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
Full Idea: There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07) | |
A reaction: The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive. |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
Full Idea: By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09) | |
A reaction: There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements. |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49) | |
A reaction: There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable. |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
Full Idea: It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref) | |
A reaction: A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication. |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We can understand thinking without imagination or sensation, as is quite clear to anyone who attends to the matter. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53) | |
A reaction: We may certainly take it that Descartes means if it is understandable then it is logically possible. To believe that thinking could occur without imagination strikes me as an astonishing error. I take imagination to be more central than understanding. |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Because each one of us understands what he thinks, and that in thinking he can shut himself off from every other substance, we may conclude that each of us is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from corporeal substance. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a novel argument which requires elucidation. I can 'shut myself off from every other substance'? If I shut myself off from thinking about food, does that mean hunger is not part of me? Or convince yourself that you don't have a brother? |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
Full Idea: It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most common notions found innately in us. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.39) | |
A reaction: It seems to me plausible to say that we have an innate conception of our own will (our ability to make decisions), though Hume says we only learn about the will from experience, but the idea that it is absolutely 'free' might never cross our minds. |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48) | |
A reaction: This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality. |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60) | |
A reaction: If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction. |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
Full Idea: What usually misleads us is that we very frequently form a judgement although we do not have an accurate perception of what we judge. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.33) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a generally accurate observation, particularly in the making of moral judgements (which was probably not what Descartes was considering). The implication is that judgements are to a large extent forced by our perceptions. |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We do not praise automata, although they respond exactly to the movements they were designed to produce, since their actions are performed necessarily | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37) | |
A reaction: I say we attribute responsibility when we perceive something like a 'person' as causing them. We don't blame small animals, because there is 'no one at home', but we blame children as they develop a full character and identity. We can ignore free will. |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
Full Idea: That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere? |
7477 | Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson] |
Full Idea: What we regard as democracy in the twenty-first century is actually elective oligarchy. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.06) | |
A reaction: Even dictatorships want to be called 'democracies'. The modern system is a bit of a concession to Plato, and he would probably have preferred it to his system, because at least the rulers tend to be more educated than the direct assembly. |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7 | |
A reaction: This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity. |
7478 | Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson] |
Full Idea: Greek philosophers may have invented the concept of 'nature' to underline their superiority over poets and religious leaders. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.06) | |
A reaction: Brilliant. They certainly wrote a lot of books entitled 'Peri Physis' (Concerning Nature), and it was the target of their expertise. A highly significant development, along with their rational methods. Presumably Socrates extends nature to include ethics. |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
Full Idea:
We will not seek for the reason of natural things from the end which God or nature has set before him in their creation |
|
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], §28) | |
A reaction: Teleology is more relevant to biology than to the other sciences, and it is hard to understand an eye without a notion of 'what it is for'. Planetary motion reveals nothing about purposes. If you demand a purpose, it becomes more baffling. |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth. | |
From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5 |
7462 | DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson] |
Full Idea: The basic mutation rate in DNA is 0.71 percent per million years. Working back from the present difference between human and chimpanzee DNA, we arrive at 6.6 million years ago for their divergence. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.01) | |
A reaction: This database is committed to evolution (a reminder that even databases have commitments), and so facts of this kind are included, even though they are not strictly philosophical. All complaints should be inwardly digested and forgotten. |
7470 | During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson] |
Full Idea: Around the time of the rise of the first great civilizations, the main gods changed sex, as the Great Goddess, or a raft of smaller goddesses, were demoted and male gods took their place. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: Why? War, perhaps? |
7474 | Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson] |
Full Idea: Traditional Hinduism has been described as more a way of living than a way of thought; it has no founder, no prophet, no creed and no ecclesiastical structure. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: This contrast strikingly with all later religions, which felt they had to follow the Jews in becoming a 'religion of the book', with a sacred text, and hence a special status for the author(s) of that text. |
7479 | Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson] |
Full Idea: The Judaism we know today didn't become stabilized until roughly 200 CE. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
A reaction: By that stage it would have been subject to the influences of Christianity, ancient Greek philosophy, and neo-Platonism. |
7481 | The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson] |
Full Idea: Archaeology offers datable figures that seem to support the idea that the Israelites of the 'second exile' period converted Yahweh into a special, single God to justify their claims to the land. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
A reaction: The implications for middle eastern politics of this wicked observation are beyond the remit of a philosophy database. |
7480 | Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson] |
Full Idea: No one questions the fact that monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
A reaction: I take the Middle East to exclude Greece, where they were developing similar ideas. Who knows? |
7471 | The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson] |
Full Idea: The Gathas, the liturgical hymns that make up the 'Avesta', the Zoroastrian canon, are very similar in language to the oldest Sanskrit of Hinduism, so they are not much younger than 1200 BCE. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: This implies a big expansion of religion before the well-known expansion of the sixth century BCE. |
7473 | Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson] |
Full Idea: Life after death, resurrection, judgement, heaven and paradise, were all Zoroastrian firsts, as were hell and the devil. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: He appears to be the first 'prophet'. |
7484 | Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson] |
Full Idea: Jesus never intended to start a new religion. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.08) | |
A reaction: An intriguing fact, which makes you wonder whether any of the prophets ever had such an intention. |
7483 | Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson] |
Full Idea: Paul's writings - letters mainly - predate the gospels and yet make no mention of many of the more striking episodes that make up Jesus' life. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
A reaction: This is not proof of anything, but it seems very significant if we are trying to get at the facts about Jesus. |
7475 | Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson] |
Full Idea: Confucius was deeply religious in a traditional sense, showing reverence towards heaven and an omnipresent spiritual world, but he was cool towards the supernatural, and does not seem to have believed in either a personal god or an afterlife. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: The implication is that the spiritual world was very remote from us, and beyond communication. Sounds like deism. |
7476 | Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson] |
Full Idea: Underlying Taoism is a search for freedom - from the world, from the body, from the mind, from nature. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: Of all the world's religions, I think Taoism is the most ridiculouly misconceived. |
7463 | The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson] |
Full Idea: Anthropologist distinguish three requirements for religion: a non-physical soul which can survive death; individuals who can receive supernatural inspiration; and rituals which can cause changes in the present world. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.01) | |
A reaction: The latter two, of course, also imply belief in supernatural powers. |
7468 | In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson] |
Full Idea: An official Athenian war monument of 432 BCE says the souls of the dead will be received by the aither (the 'upper air'), though their bodies remain on earth. | |
From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. Did they think anything happened when they got there? There are also ideas about Hades, and the Isles of the Blessed floating around. |