4 ideas
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To say that properties are really relations to times is to treat temporary intrinsics (such as my changing shape) as a matter of relations, but then 'intrinsic properties' would not deserve the name, and it is untenable if it denies temporary intrinsics. | |
From: David Lewis (Rearrangement of Particles [1988], 1) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed a paragraph; he refers to his 1986:204] If a property is meant to be a 'relation to a time', I am not sure what the relata are meant to be, and I agree with Lewis that this seems a long way from properties. |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225) | |
A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious. |
18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
Full Idea: Whenever we have an equivalence relation among things - such as similarity in a certain respect - we can abstract under the equivalence and consider the abstractum. | |
From: Peter Simons (Modes of Extension: comment on Fine [2008], p.19) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as dressing up old-fashioned psychological abstractionism in the respectable clothing of Fregean equivalences (such as 'directions'). We can actually do what Simons wants without the precision of partitioned equivalence classes. |
18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
Full Idea: Abstraction as a cognitive tool has been associated predominantly with the metaphysics of universals and of mathematical objects such as numbers. But it is more widely applicable beyond this standard range. I commend its judicious use. | |
From: Peter Simons (Modes of Extension: comment on Fine [2008], p.21) | |
A reaction: Personally I think our view of the world is founded on three psychological principles: abstraction, idealisation and generalisation. You can try to give them rigour, as 'equivalence classes', or 'universal quantifications', if it makes you feel better. |