6 ideas
| 13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals. |
| 13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date. |
| 13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
| A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible. |
| 23224 | That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley] |
| Full Idea: [Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own. | |
| From: Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2 | |
| A reaction: Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails. |
| 3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225) | |
| A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious. |
| 13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
| A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing. |