Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Fourth Objections', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Metaphysics: a very short introduction'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour

6848	Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour, for me, is practically enacted philosophy.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: This may be overstating it, as the funniest jokes may be the least philosophical, and remarks may be faintly amusing but very profound. Lear and his Fool make up a single worldview together.

6847	Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour provides an oblique phenomenology of ordinary life; it is a way of describing the situation of our existence, and, at its best, it indicates how we might change that situation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: The trouble is that this leads us to relentlessly political standup comedians who aren't very funny. Critichley may have a problem with remarks which are very funny precisely because they are so politically incorrect. I sympathise, though.

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

6844	Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
	A reaction: He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

6835	German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
	A reaction: He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.

6837	Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.

6836	Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If reason must criticise itself (in Kant) how does one avoid total scepticism? In my view, the problem that has animated the continental tradition since Jacobi (early 19th cent) is the threat of nihilism.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: As an outsider to 'continental' philosophy, this is the most illuminating remark I have read about it. It is not only a plausible account of the movement, but also a very worth aim, which should be taken seriously by analytical philosophers.

6838	Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
	Full Idea: The basic map of the continental tradition can be summarised in three terms: critique, praxis and emancipation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.189)
	A reaction: I wince at 'emancipation', which seems to take freedom as of unquestionably high value, instead of being one of the principles up for question in social philosophy. There are more presuppositions in Marxist than in analytical philosophy.

6845	Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
	A reaction: From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology

6846	Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Phenomenology (as in the later Husserl) is for me a way of assembling reminders which clarify the social world in which we exist; it is a technique of redescription.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: I'm not sure if I can identify with this as a target for philosophy, but it is interesting and sound worthy of effort. Critchley offers this as the best strand in 'continental' philosophy, rather than the big explanatory ideas.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

18617	Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
	Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts.
	From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3)
	A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain?

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility

18618	Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
	Full Idea: It has been suggested that we could think of possibilities as recombinations of all the existing elements of reality.
	From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
	A reaction: [Armstrong 1989 is the source] The obvious problem would be that the existence of an entirely different reality would be impossible, if this was all possibility could be. It seems to cramp the style of the possible too much. Are properties elements?

18619	Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
	Full Idea: The combinatorial account only works if you allow that the elements are recombinable. ...But could Lincoln really have been green? It seems possible that you could jump to the moon, unless we impose some restrictions.
	From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
	A reaction: Mumford suggests different combination rules for logical and natural possibility. The general objection is that combinatorial possibility is too permissive - which it clearly is.

18620	Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
	Full Idea: Can combinatorial possibility deliver enough possibilities? It uses the existing elements, but there might have been one more particular or one more property. Even extended over time, the elements seem finite, yet there could have been more.
	From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
	A reaction: [compressed] One objection is that the theory allows too much, and now the objection is that it allows too little. Both objections are correct, so that's the end of that. But I admire the attempt to base modality on actuality.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism

3643	The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
	From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
	A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism

6843	Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
	A reaction: This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.