Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Fourth Objections', 'Letter to Bramhall' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

15787	Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
	Full Idea: It might be said that Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle.
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
	A reaction: I don't buy this, if it meant to be dismissive of the relevance of the principle to truth. A deep question might be, what is so aesthetically attractive about simplicity? I'm inclined to think that application of the Razor has delivered terrific results.

15784	The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
	Full Idea: A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
	A reaction: See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

15792	Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties.
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
	A reaction: [Lycan cites Castañeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16620	A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure?
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

16622	Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future?

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15795	Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
	Full Idea: A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events.
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
	A reaction: Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic!

15796	Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
	Full Idea: I believe the only promising choice of actual entities to serve as 'worlds' is that of sets of intensional objects, such as propositions or properties with stipulated interrelations.
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 12)
	A reaction: This is mainly in response to Lewis's construction of them out of actual concrete objects. It strikes me as a bogus problem. It is just a convenient way to think precisely about possibilities, and occasionally outruns our mental capacity.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions

15794	If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
	Full Idea: If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
	From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
	A reaction: [Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism

3643	The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
	From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
	A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.