Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Passions of the Soul', 'Prescriptivism' and 'Sentences'

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10 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
     Full Idea: The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes sees passions not as opinions, but as functional devices that the Creator has designed for us to help preserve the body-soul substantial union.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: I wonder what Descartes would have made of the theory of evolution?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
     A reaction: A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
     Full Idea: Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
     A reaction: [not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 18), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 1 'Volitionism'
     A reaction: Stout attributes this to Descartes' dualism, as if legs are separate from persons. Stout says the idea of a prior mental act is not usually now considered as part of an action, or even to exist at all. If the volition is intentional, there is a regress.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2854 Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
     A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
2856 Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by').
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: Presumably strength of will can serve evil ends, so this is a bit confusing.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
16697 Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion.
     From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2
     A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation.