7024
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Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
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A reaction:
At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
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9478
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Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1
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A reaction:
I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though!
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16614
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Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
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Full Idea:
From matter and form comes one thing per se. This is not so for subject and accident. Matter and form are instrinsic causes of a composite being, but whiteness and a human being are not. Humans can exist without whiteness, so it is one thing per accidens.
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From:
John Duns Scotus (Oxford Commentary on Sentences [1301], II.12.1.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
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A reaction:
This isn't much of a theory, but at least it is focusing on an interesting question, and the distinction between genuinely unified, and unified by chance. Compare a loving couple with siblings who hate each other.
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10728
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A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
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A reaction:
This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job.
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3654
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The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
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4313
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Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
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Full Idea:
Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
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A reaction:
A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
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23989
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There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
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Full Idea:
Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
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A reaction:
[not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
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