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All the ideas for 'Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts', 'Sentences' and 'Aquinas, Thomas'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

18528	The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
	Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
	A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

12887	A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
	Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
	From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
	A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration

22110	Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump]
	Full Idea: According to Aquinas, what demonstration provides is not so much knowledge as conceived by foundationalists as depth of understanding and explanatory insight.
	From: Kretzmann/Stump (Aquinas, Thomas [2005]), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
	A reaction: It was noticeable that Aristotle didn't make clear what demonstration aims to achieve, and he didn't employ it elsewhere in his writings. We aim for understanding, not for well grounded propositions. Understanding needs implications and mechanisms.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16589	Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
	Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

16651	God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
	Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
	A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.