9 ideas
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
| 18344 | Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow] |
| Full Idea: If something is true, then it would not be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don't, or else certain things had not existed which do. | |
| From: John Bigelow (The Reality of Numbers [1988], 19) | |
| A reaction: This is described by Rami as Bigelow's 'famous' formulation of the idea that 'truth supervenes on being' in a general way. An immediate question would be about fictions. Is Malvolio a stupid man, given that he doesn't exist? We must stretch 'exist'. |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
| A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
| A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |
| 15313 | By 'force' I mean the sources of all actions - sometimes called 'powers' by their outcomes [Breheny] |
| Full Idea: I mean by the word 'force' the source or sources of all possible actions of the particles or materials of the universe: these being often called the powers of nature when spoken of in relation to the different manners in which their effects are shown. | |
| From: Richard Breheny (Letter to Clerk Maxwell [1855]), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B | |
| A reaction: He uses 'force' for what is fundamental, and 'powers' for their results. I am inclining to talk of 'fundamental powers' and 'complex powers', leaving the word 'force' to the physicists. |