Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scattered Objects', 'Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion' and 'Letters to Descartes'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: There is at the moment a pipe on my desk. Its stem has been removed but it remains a pipe for all that; otherwise no pipe could survive a thorough cleaning.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.175)
     A reaction: To say that the pipe survives dismantling is not to say that it is fully a pipe during its dismantled phase. He gives a further example of a book in two volumes.
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: If a branch falls from a tree, the tree does not thereby become scattered, and a human body does not become scattered upon loss of a bit of fingernail.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Scattered Objects [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This sort of observation draws me towards essentialism. A body is scattered if you divide it in a major way, but not if you separate off a minor part. It isn't just a matter of size, or even function. We have broader idea of what is essential.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
     Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3)
     A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
A soul with physical extension is more likely than an immaterial soul that moves bodies [Elizabeth]
     Full Idea: I would find it easier to concede matter and extension to the soul than to concede that an immaterial thing could move and be moved by a body.
     From: Elizabeth, Princess of Bohemia (Letters to Descartes [1643], p.42), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
     A reaction: Very nicely expressed! I'm trying to imagine a ghost which finds itself stuck with a physical body which it has to drag around like a reluctant dog. She is stating the classic interaction problem which plagues all mind-body dualism.