12 ideas
| 8000 | He who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it [Santayana, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Santayana remarked that he who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it. | |
| From: report of George Santayana (The Life of Reason [1906]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Santayana's remark seems to have been about history in general, so this is a Macintyre thought. It obviously has a lot of truth, and most great philosophers seem hugely knowledgeable. However, ignorance brings a kind of freedom. |
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason. |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| Full Idea: An 'antidote' (or 'mask') to a disposition (unlike a 'finkish' one) leaves the disposition intact, but interferes with the causal chain between the disposition and its manifestation so that the manifestation doesn't come about. | |
| From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Bird 1997] Thus the disposition of the poison at least begins to manifest, but its disposition to kill is blocked. So what was the disposition of the poison? |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| Full Idea: An object's disposition is said to be 'finkish' if the object loses the disposition after the occurrence of the appropriate stimulus, but before the manifestation has had time to come about. | |
| From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Lewis 1997] An example would be some sort of safety device which only cuts in if the disposition seems about to operate (e.g. turns off electricity). It seems to block analyses of dispositions simply in terms of their outcomes. |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| Full Idea: If we have no good reason to believe that a disposition is instantiated, then the disposition should play no role in our theorizing about the world. | |
| From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 3) | |
| A reaction: It is part of our theory that a substantial lump of uranium will explode, but also that a galaxy-sized lump of uranium would explode. Surely we are committed to the latter, even though it never happens? |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| Full Idea: The dispositional essentialist can argue that what happens in laboratory conditions is that, by controlling external influences, we effectively 'unmask' the relevant dispositions, and thus observe the regularities to which those dispositions give rise. | |
| From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 5) | |
| A reaction: That seems to me to be exactly right, though Corry dislikes it, and even suggests that dispositional essentialist might not like it. |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
| A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check? |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132). |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
| A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule? |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
| Full Idea: Dispositional essentialism implies that the fundamental laws of nature must be strict, not ceteris paribus. | |
| From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 1) | |
| A reaction: I am not keen on the 'laws' of nature, but since essentialism seems to make them necessary, you can't get stricter than that. |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question. |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality. |