Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'The Structure of Science' and 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
     Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
     A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction has been defined as deriving one theory from another by logic and maths [Nagel,E, by Kim]
     Full Idea: Ernest Nagel defines reduction as the possibility of deriving all laws of one theory by logic and mathematics to another theory, with appropriate 'bridging principles' (either definitions, or empirical laws) connecting the expressions of the two theories.
     From: report of Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science [1961]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.213
     A reaction: This has been labelled as 'weak' reduction, where 'strong' reduction would be identity, as when lightning is reduced to electrical discharge. You reduce x by showing that it is y in disguise.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
     Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
     A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
     Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
     A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
     Full Idea: There are convictions which are common to most societies; but there are others which are not, and no way is given by intuitionists of telling which are the authoritative data.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.454)
     A reaction: It seems unfair on intuitionists to say they haven't given a way to evaluate such things, given that they have offered intuition. The issue is what exactly they mean by 'intuition'.
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
     Full Idea: If it comes to deciding what intuitions and dispositions to cultivate, we cannot rely on the intuitions themselves, as intuitionists do.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.461)
     A reaction: Makes intuitionists sound a bit dim. Surely Hume identifies dispositions (such as benevolence) which should be cultivated, because they self-evidently improve social life?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
     Full Idea: Emotivists concluded too hastily that because naturalism and intuitionism are false, you cannot reason about moral questions, because they assumed that the only questions you can reason about are factual ones.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455)
     A reaction: Personally I have a naturalistic view of ethics (based on successful functioning, as indicated by Aristotle), so not my prob. Why can't we reason about expressive emotions? We reason about art.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
     Full Idea: Universal prescriptivists hold that 'ought'-judgements are prescriptive like plain imperatives, but differ from them in being universalisable.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.457)
     A reaction: Sounds a bit tautological. Which comes first, the normativity or the universalisability?
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
     Full Idea: Non-descriptivists (e.g. prescriptivists) reject descriptivism in its naturalist or intuitionist form, because they are both destined to collapse into relativism.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.453)
     A reaction: I'm not clear from this why prescriptism would not also turn out to be relativist, if it includes evaluations along with facts.
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
     Full Idea: Ethical descriptivism is the view that ethical sentence-meaning is wholly determined by truth-conditions. …Prescriptivists think there is a further element of meaning, which expresses prescriptions or evaluations or attitudes which we assent to.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.452)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand either of these. If all meaning consists of truth-conditions, that will apply to ethics. If meaning includes evaluations, that will apply to non-ethics.
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivists claim that there are rules of reasoning which govern non-descriptive as well as descriptive speech acts. The standard example is possible logical inconsistency between contradictory prescriptions.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455)
     A reaction: The example doesn't seem very good. Inconsistency can appear in any area of thought, but that isn't enough to infer full 'rules of reasoning'. I could desire two incompatible crazy things.
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
     Full Idea: In any 'ought' statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar situations.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.456)
     A reaction: No two situations can ever be 'precisely' similar. Indeed, 'precisely similar' may be an oxymoron (at least for situations). Kantians presumably like this idea.
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivists hold that moral judgements commit the speaker to motivations and actions, but non-moral facts by themselves do not do this.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.459)
     A reaction: Surely hunger motivates to action? I suppose the key word is 'commit'. But lazy people are allowed to make moral judgements.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
     Full Idea: To make moral judgements is implicitly to invoke some principle, however specific.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.458)