20 ideas
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
Full Idea: The unexamined life is not worth living for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 38a | |
A reaction: I wonder why? I can see Nietzsche offering aristocratic heroes and dancers as counterexamples. Compare Idea 3798. |
8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2 | |
A reaction: This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved. |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
Full Idea: There are convictions which are common to most societies; but there are others which are not, and no way is given by intuitionists of telling which are the authoritative data. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.454) | |
A reaction: It seems unfair on intuitionists to say they haven't given a way to evaluate such things, given that they have offered intuition. The issue is what exactly they mean by 'intuition'. |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
Full Idea: If it comes to deciding what intuitions and dispositions to cultivate, we cannot rely on the intuitions themselves, as intuitionists do. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.461) | |
A reaction: Makes intuitionists sound a bit dim. Surely Hume identifies dispositions (such as benevolence) which should be cultivated, because they self-evidently improve social life? |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
Full Idea: Emotivists concluded too hastily that because naturalism and intuitionism are false, you cannot reason about moral questions, because they assumed that the only questions you can reason about are factual ones. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455) | |
A reaction: Personally I have a naturalistic view of ethics (based on successful functioning, as indicated by Aristotle), so not my prob. Why can't we reason about expressive emotions? We reason about art. |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
Full Idea: In any 'ought' statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar situations. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.456) | |
A reaction: No two situations can ever be 'precisely' similar. Indeed, 'precisely similar' may be an oxymoron (at least for situations). Kantians presumably like this idea. |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
Full Idea: Non-descriptivists (e.g. prescriptivists) reject descriptivism in its naturalist or intuitionist form, because they are both destined to collapse into relativism. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.453) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear from this why prescriptism would not also turn out to be relativist, if it includes evaluations along with facts. |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
Full Idea: Ethical descriptivism is the view that ethical sentence-meaning is wholly determined by truth-conditions. …Prescriptivists think there is a further element of meaning, which expresses prescriptions or evaluations or attitudes which we assent to. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.452) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand either of these. If all meaning consists of truth-conditions, that will apply to ethics. If meaning includes evaluations, that will apply to non-ethics. |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivists claim that there are rules of reasoning which govern non-descriptive as well as descriptive speech acts. The standard example is possible logical inconsistency between contradictory prescriptions. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455) | |
A reaction: The example doesn't seem very good. Inconsistency can appear in any area of thought, but that isn't enough to infer full 'rules of reasoning'. I could desire two incompatible crazy things. |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivists hold that moral judgements commit the speaker to motivations and actions, but non-moral facts by themselves do not do this. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.459) | |
A reaction: Surely hunger motivates to action? I suppose the key word is 'commit'. But lazy people are allowed to make moral judgements. |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
Full Idea: Universal prescriptivists hold that 'ought'-judgements are prescriptive like plain imperatives, but differ from them in being universalisable. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.457) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit tautological. Which comes first, the normativity or the universalisability? |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
Full Idea: If death is like a night of dreamless sleep it is an advantage, for such nights are very pleasant, and eternity would seem like a single night. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 40d | |
A reaction: Dreamless sleep is only pleasant if being awake is unpleasant. Very quiet days are only pleasant if the active days are horrible. A desire for a totally quiet life is absurd. |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
Full Idea: No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 29a | |
A reaction: As a neutral observer, I see little sign of it being a blessing, except as a relief from misery. It seem wrong to view such a natural thing as evil, but it is the thing most of us least desire. |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One should never return an injustice nor harm another human being no matter what one suffers at their hands. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49c | |
A reaction: Jesus of Nazareth was not the first person to make this suggestion. |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
Full Idea: A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 41d |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49b | |
A reaction: The same as the essential moral teachings of Jesus (see Idea 6288) and Lao Tzu (Idea 6324). The big target is not to be corrupted by the evil of other people. |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 30b |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
Full Idea: To make moral judgements is implicitly to invoke some principle, however specific. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.458) |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Do I intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgement at my trial? | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 50c |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates denies the gods, because he says the sun is stone and the moon is earth. | |
From: report of Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]) by Plato - The Apology 26d |