Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Character of Physical Law', 'Space, Time and Deity (2 vols)' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy

15970	People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman]
	Full Idea: The topic of the laws of nature has a tendency to become too philosophical because it becomes too general, and a person talks in such generalities, that everybody can understand him. It is then considered to be some deep philosophy.
	From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], 1)
	A reaction: Feynman was famously anti-philosophical, but this is a good challenge. I like philosophy because I want to know broad general truths about my world, but I may just be gravitating towards what is easier. The challenge is to get true generalities.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15453	The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
	A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15452	We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
	Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
	A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

14494	Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
	Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
	From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
	A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

9410	Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
	Full Idea: There is a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye, but only to the eye of analysis; and it is these rhythms and patterns which we call Physical Laws.
	From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], Ch.1)

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics

18530	Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman]
	Full Idea: I think I can safely say the nobody understands quantum mechanics.
	From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], 6)
	A reaction: It is really important that philosophers grasp this point!

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space

17707	We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]
	Full Idea: Feynman claims that we should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces, which have positive length, width and depth.
	From: report of Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], p.166) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 06.7
	A reaction: The idea seems to be these are the minimum bits of space in which something can happen.