Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason', 'Questions on Aristotle's Physics' and 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Not only is traditional philosophy incapable of discovering the foundations it seeks, but the philosophical enterprise may itself dislodge the contingent, de facto supports that our daily life depends upon.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: In the end Fogelin is not so pessimistic, but he is worried by the concern of philosophers with paradox and contradiction. I don't remotely consider this a reason to reject philosophy, but it might be a reason to keep it sealed off from daily life.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The three main threats to our rational lives are fear of inconsistency, illusions (of absolutism and relativism) and doubt.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is a very nice analysis of the forces that can destroy the philosopher's aspiration to the rational life. Personally I still suffer from a few illusions about the possibility of absolutes, but I may grow out of it. The other three don't bother me.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: It might be wholly unreasonable to suppose that human beings will ever be able to attain a view of the world that is both suitably rich and completely consistent.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: Fogelin's lectures develop this view very persuasively. I think all philosophers must believe that the gods could attain a 'rich and consistent' view. Our problem is that we are a badly organised team, whose members keep dying.
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The presence of an inconsistency in the rules that govern a game need not destroy the game.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: He only defends this thesis if the inconsistency is away from the main centre of the action. You can't have an inconsistent definition of scoring a goal or a touchdown.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Traditionally many philosophers (Aristotle among them) have considered the law of noncontradiction to be the deepest, most fundamental principle of rationality.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1)
     A reaction: For Aristotle, see Idea 1601 (and 'Metaphysics' 1005b28). The only denier of the basic character of the law that I know of is Nietzsche (Idea 4531). Fogelin, despite many qualifications, endorses the law, and so do I.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: People who reject the law of noncontradiction obliterate any significant difference between asserting something and denying it; …this will not move anyone who genuinely opts either for silence or for madness.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems a sufficiently firm and clear assertion of the basic nature of this law. The only rival view seems to be that of Nietzsche (Idea 4531), but then you wonder how Nietzsche is in a position to assert the relativity of the law.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: There is almost universal agreement that legal reasoning is fundamentally analogical, not deductive, in character.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This raises the question of whether analogy can be considered as 'reasoning' in itself. How do you compare the examples? Could you compare two examples if you lacked language, or rules, or a scale of values?
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine]
     Full Idea: Gödel's proof wrought an abrupt turn in the philosophy of mathematics. We had supposed that truth, in mathematics, consisted in provability.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Willard Quine - Forward to Gödel's Unpublished
     A reaction: This explains the crisis in the early 1930s, which Tarski's theory appeared to solve.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M]
     Full Idea: Gödel's incompleteness results of 1931 show that all axiom systems precise enough to satisfy Hilbert's conception are necessarily incomplete.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1215
     A reaction: [Hallett italicises 'necessarily'] Hilbert axioms have to be recursive - that is, everything in the system must track back to them.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner]
     Full Idea: The inherent limitations of the axiomatic method were first brought to light by the incompleteness theorems.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P]
     Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: roughly, nice theories that include enough basic arithmetic can't prove their own consistency.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.5
     A reaction: On the face of it, this sounds less surprising than the First Theorem. Philosophers have often noticed that it seems unlikely that you could use reason to prove reason, as when Descartes just relies on 'clear and distinct ideas'.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: Gödel showed PA cannot be proved consistent from with PA. But 'reflection principles' can be added, which are axioms partially expressing the soundness of PA, by asserting what is provable. A Global Reflection Principle asserts full soundness.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. - Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) 1.2
     A reaction: The authors point out that this needs a truth predicate within the language, so disquotational truth won't do, and there is a motivation for an axiomatic theory of truth.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel]
     Full Idea: Where Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicist ambitions, the Second Theorem sabotages Hilbert's Programme.
     From: comment on Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 36
     A reaction: Neo-logicism (Crispin Wright etc.) has a strategy for evading the First Theorem.
The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel]
     Full Idea: My undecidable arithmetical sentence ...is not at all absolutely undecidable; rather, one can always pass to 'higher' systems in which the sentence in question is decidable.
     From: Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1
     A reaction: [a 1931 MS] He says the reals are 'higher' than the naturals, and the axioms of set theory are higher still. The addition of a truth predicate is part of what makes the sentence become decidable.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: Gödel's far-reaching work on the nature of logic and formal systems reveals that there can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.8
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Gödel's theorem states that either arithmetic is incomplete, or it is inconsistent.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.7
First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P]
     Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: any properly axiomatised and consistent theory of basic arithmetic must remain incomplete, whatever our efforts to complete it by throwing further axioms into the mix.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.2
     A reaction: This is because it is always possible to formulate a well-formed sentence which is not provable within the theory.
Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman]
     Full Idea: The vast continent of arithmetical truth cannot be brought into systematic order by laying down a fixed set of axioms and rules of inference from which every true mathematical statement can be formally derived. For some this was a shocking revelation.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by E Nagel / JR Newman - Gödel's Proof VII.C
     A reaction: Good news for philosophy, I'd say. The truth cannot be worked out by mechanical procedures, so it needs the subtle and intuitive intelligence of your proper philosopher (Parmenides is the role model) to actually understand reality.
Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that true unprovable sentences are clearly semantic consequences of the axioms in the sense that they are necessarily true if the axioms are true. So semantic consequence outruns provability.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3
First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S is syntactically incomplete.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: Gödel found a single sentence, effectively saying 'I am unprovable in S', which is neither provable nor refutable in S.
Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S cannot prove its own consistency
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: This seems much less surprising than the First Theorem (though it derives from it). It was always kind of obvious that you couldn't use reason to prove that reason works (see, for example, the Cartesian Circle).
There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P]
     Full Idea: The original Gödel construction gives us a sentence that a theory shows is true if and only if it satisfies the condition of being unprovable-in-that-theory.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 20.5
'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg]
     Full Idea: An approximation of Gödel's Theorem imagines a statement 'This system of mathematics can't prove this statement true'. If the system proves the statement, then it can't prove it. If the statement can't prove the statement, clearly it still can't prove it.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15
     A reaction: Gödel's contribution to this simple idea seems to be a demonstration that formal arithmetic is capable of expressing such a statement.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Gödel defended impredicative definitions on grounds of ontological realism. From that perspective, an impredicative definition is a description of an existing entity with reference to other existing entities.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3
     A reaction: This is why constructivists must be absolutely precise about definition, where realists only have to do their best. Compare building a car with painting a landscape.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
     Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4
     A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3
     A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals?
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Convention, to exist at all, must have a basis in something that is not conventional; conventions, to work, need something nonconventional to build upon and shape.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Fogelin attributes his point to Hume. I agree entirely. No convention could ever possibly catch on in a society unless there were some point to it. If you can't see a point to a convention (like wearing ties) then start looking, because it's there.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: My own view might be called 'circumspect rationalism' - the view that our intellectual faculties provide our only means for comprehending the world in which we find oruselves.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: He needs to say more than that to offer a theory, but I like the label, and it fits the modern revival of rationalism, with which I sympathise, and which rests, I think, on Russell's point that self-evidence comes in degrees, not as all-or-nothing truth.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: In general a knowledge claim is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The problem here is what is 'relevant'. Fogelin's example is 'Are you sure the suspect doesn't have a twin brother?' If virtual reality is relevant, most knowledge is defeated. Certainly, imaginative people feel that they know less than others.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Coherentists argue that if the circle of justifications is big enough, rich enough, coherent enough, and so on, then there is nothing wrong circularity.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: There must always be something wrong with circularity, and no god would put up with it, but we might have to. Of course, two pieces of evidence might be unconnected, such as an equation and an observation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The three forms of scepticism are cartesian, Humean and Pyrrhonian. The first challenges belief by inventing sceptical scenarios; the second doubts the future; the third aims to suspend belief.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: A standard distinction is made between methodological and global scepticism. The former seems to be Cartesian, and the latter Pyrrhonian. The interest here is see Hume placed in a distinctive category, because of his views on induction.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Sceptical scenarios deal in wildly remote defeating possibilities, so that the level of scrutiny becomes unrestrictedly high, and they also usually deal with defeators that are in principle ineliminable.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The question of how high we 'set the bar' seems to me central to epistemology. There is clearly an element of social negotiation involved, centring on what is appropriate. If, though, scepticism is 'ineliminable', we must face up to that.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
     A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
     A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Gödel in his completeness theorem for first-order logic showed that a certain set of syntactically specifiable rules was adequate to capture all first-order valid arguments. No semantics (e.g. reference, truth, validity) was necessary.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.2
     A reaction: This implies that a logic machine is possible, but we shouldn't raise our hopes for proper rationality. Validity can be shown for purely algebraic arguments, but rationality requires truth as well as validity, and that needs propositions and semantics.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: We as human beings are also irrational animals, unique among animals in our capacity to place faith in bizarre fictions of our own construction.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: This is glaringly true, and a very nice corrective to the talk of Greeks and others about man as the 'rational animal'. From a distance we might be described by Martians as the 'mad animal'. Is the irrational current too strong to swim against?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Critics must become causally entangled with their subject matter.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This remark is built on Hume's views. You may have a strong view about a singer, but it may be hard to maintain when someone plays you six rival versions of the same piece. I agree entirely with the remark. It means there are aesthetic experts.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Like the word 'good', the word 'beautiful', when deprived of contextual support, is nearly contentless.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6)
     A reaction: If I say with, for example, Oscar Wilde that beauty is the highest ideal in life, this doesn't strike me as contentless, but I still sympathise with Fogelin's notion that beauty is rooted in particulars.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: "It is all a matter of taste" may be an all-purpose stopper of discussions of aesthetic values, but it also completely severs the connection with the actual properties of the object under consideration.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This remark grows out of his discussion of Hume. I like this remark, which ties in with Particularism in morality, and with the central role of experiments in science. The world forces beliefs on us.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Cynics are usually unswerving in their commitment to a moral ideal, but disappointed or disgusted by humanity's failure to meet it.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I felt quite suicidal the other day when I saw someone park diagonally across two parking spaces. They can't seem to grasp the elementary Kantian slogan 'What if everybody did that?' It's all hopeless. I wonder if I am becoming a bit of a Cynic?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The purposes of punishment include deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution, but they don't always sit well together. Deterrence is best served by making prisons miserable places, but this may run counter to rehabilitation.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: It seems to most educated people that retribution should be pushed far down the list if we are to be civilised (see Idea 1659), and yet personal revenge for a small act of aggression seems basic, normal and acceptable. We dream of rehabilitation.
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: A strict retributivist is likely to say that once a crime is paid for, that's that; a deterrence theorist is likely to say that the protection of potential victims overrides the released convict's right to a free and fresh start.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Interesting since the retributivist here has the more liberal attitude. Reformists will also have a dilemma when years in prison have failed to reform the convict. Virtue theorists like balance, and sensitively consider our relations with the criminals.