50 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others. |
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Not only is traditional philosophy incapable of discovering the foundations it seeks, but the philosophical enterprise may itself dislodge the contingent, de facto supports that our daily life depends upon. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: In the end Fogelin is not so pessimistic, but he is worried by the concern of philosophers with paradox and contradiction. I don't remotely consider this a reason to reject philosophy, but it might be a reason to keep it sealed off from daily life. |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!). |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling. |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The three main threats to our rational lives are fear of inconsistency, illusions (of absolutism and relativism) and doubt. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice analysis of the forces that can destroy the philosopher's aspiration to the rational life. Personally I still suffer from a few illusions about the possibility of absolutes, but I may grow out of it. The other three don't bother me. |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: It might be wholly unreasonable to suppose that human beings will ever be able to attain a view of the world that is both suitably rich and completely consistent. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fogelin's lectures develop this view very persuasively. I think all philosophers must believe that the gods could attain a 'rich and consistent' view. Our problem is that we are a badly organised team, whose members keep dying. |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The presence of an inconsistency in the rules that govern a game need not destroy the game. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He only defends this thesis if the inconsistency is away from the main centre of the action. You can't have an inconsistent definition of scoring a goal or a touchdown. |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Traditionally many philosophers (Aristotle among them) have considered the law of noncontradiction to be the deepest, most fundamental principle of rationality. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: For Aristotle, see Idea 1601 (and 'Metaphysics' 1005b28). The only denier of the basic character of the law that I know of is Nietzsche (Idea 4531). Fogelin, despite many qualifications, endorses the law, and so do I. |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: People who reject the law of noncontradiction obliterate any significant difference between asserting something and denying it; …this will not move anyone who genuinely opts either for silence or for madness. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a sufficiently firm and clear assertion of the basic nature of this law. The only rival view seems to be that of Nietzsche (Idea 4531), but then you wonder how Nietzsche is in a position to assert the relativity of the law. |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: There is almost universal agreement that legal reasoning is fundamentally analogical, not deductive, in character. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This raises the question of whether analogy can be considered as 'reasoning' in itself. How do you compare the examples? Could you compare two examples if you lacked language, or rules, or a scale of values? |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Convention, to exist at all, must have a basis in something that is not conventional; conventions, to work, need something nonconventional to build upon and shape. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Fogelin attributes his point to Hume. I agree entirely. No convention could ever possibly catch on in a society unless there were some point to it. If you can't see a point to a convention (like wearing ties) then start looking, because it's there. |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: My own view might be called 'circumspect rationalism' - the view that our intellectual faculties provide our only means for comprehending the world in which we find oruselves. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: He needs to say more than that to offer a theory, but I like the label, and it fits the modern revival of rationalism, with which I sympathise, and which rests, I think, on Russell's point that self-evidence comes in degrees, not as all-or-nothing truth. |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim. |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: In general a knowledge claim is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The problem here is what is 'relevant'. Fogelin's example is 'Are you sure the suspect doesn't have a twin brother?' If virtual reality is relevant, most knowledge is defeated. Certainly, imaginative people feel that they know less than others. |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Coherentists argue that if the circle of justifications is big enough, rich enough, coherent enough, and so on, then there is nothing wrong circularity. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: There must always be something wrong with circularity, and no god would put up with it, but we might have to. Of course, two pieces of evidence might be unconnected, such as an equation and an observation. |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results. |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The three forms of scepticism are cartesian, Humean and Pyrrhonian. The first challenges belief by inventing sceptical scenarios; the second doubts the future; the third aims to suspend belief. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: A standard distinction is made between methodological and global scepticism. The former seems to be Cartesian, and the latter Pyrrhonian. The interest here is see Hume placed in a distinctive category, because of his views on induction. |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Sceptical scenarios deal in wildly remote defeating possibilities, so that the level of scrutiny becomes unrestrictedly high, and they also usually deal with defeators that are in principle ineliminable. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The question of how high we 'set the bar' seems to me central to epistemology. There is clearly an element of social negotiation involved, centring on what is appropriate. If, though, scepticism is 'ineliminable', we must face up to that. |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible. |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex. |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry. |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type? |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual. |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6) | |
A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory. |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind. |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate. |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though. |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12) | |
A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public. |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics? |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community. |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction. |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild? |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions. |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics! |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions. |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist! |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made. |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: We as human beings are also irrational animals, unique among animals in our capacity to place faith in bizarre fictions of our own construction. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is glaringly true, and a very nice corrective to the talk of Greeks and others about man as the 'rational animal'. From a distance we might be described by Martians as the 'mad animal'. Is the irrational current too strong to swim against? |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Critics must become causally entangled with their subject matter. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This remark is built on Hume's views. You may have a strong view about a singer, but it may be hard to maintain when someone plays you six rival versions of the same piece. I agree entirely with the remark. It means there are aesthetic experts. |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Like the word 'good', the word 'beautiful', when deprived of contextual support, is nearly contentless. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: If I say with, for example, Oscar Wilde that beauty is the highest ideal in life, this doesn't strike me as contentless, but I still sympathise with Fogelin's notion that beauty is rooted in particulars. |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: "It is all a matter of taste" may be an all-purpose stopper of discussions of aesthetic values, but it also completely severs the connection with the actual properties of the object under consideration. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This remark grows out of his discussion of Hume. I like this remark, which ties in with Particularism in morality, and with the central role of experiments in science. The world forces beliefs on us. |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Cynics are usually unswerving in their commitment to a moral ideal, but disappointed or disgusted by humanity's failure to meet it. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I felt quite suicidal the other day when I saw someone park diagonally across two parking spaces. They can't seem to grasp the elementary Kantian slogan 'What if everybody did that?' It's all hopeless. I wonder if I am becoming a bit of a Cynic? |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists. |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests. |
295 | The good is beautiful [Plato] |
Full Idea: The good is beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 216d) | |
A reaction: also Timaeus 87c |
294 | People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato] |
Full Idea: People say that friendship exists only between good men. | |
From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 214d) |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it. |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though! |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The purposes of punishment include deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution, but they don't always sit well together. Deterrence is best served by making prisons miserable places, but this may run counter to rehabilitation. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to most educated people that retribution should be pushed far down the list if we are to be civilised (see Idea 1659), and yet personal revenge for a small act of aggression seems basic, normal and acceptable. We dream of rehabilitation. |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: A strict retributivist is likely to say that once a crime is paid for, that's that; a deterrence theorist is likely to say that the protection of potential victims overrides the released convict's right to a free and fresh start. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting since the retributivist here has the more liberal attitude. Reformists will also have a dilemma when years in prison have failed to reform the convict. Virtue theorists like balance, and sensitively consider our relations with the criminals. |