29 ideas
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: My idea is that conceptual examination might be a way of recovering information previously obtained through the senses. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.8) | |
A reaction: Now you're talking! This is really interesting conceptual analysis, rather than the sort of stamp-collecting approach to analsis practised by the duller sort of philosopher. But why bother with conceptual examination, when you have senses? |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Instead of considering only a proposition's 'correspondence to the facts', we should also consider the correspondence between parts of the proposition and parts of the world (a 'correspondence-as-congruence' view). | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], Final - Branching) | |
A reaction: This is something like Russell's Othello example (1912), except that the parts there, with relations seemed to add up to the whole proposition. For Jenkins, presumably parts might correspond, but the whole proposition fail to. |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: We might arrive to the concept of infinity by composing concepts of negation and finiteness. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably lots of concepts can be arrived at by negating prior concepts (such as not-wet, not-tall, not-loud, not-straight). So not-infinite is perfectly plausible, and is a far better account than some a priori intuition of pure infinity. Love it. |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: The indispensability of arithmetical concepts is evidence that they do in fact accurately represent features of the independent world. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be by far the best account of the matter. So why is the world so arithmetical? Dunno, mate; ask someone else. |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: I propose that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our own arithmetical concepts; that basic arithmetical concepts map the arithmetical structure of the world; that the map obtains in virtue of our normal sensory apparatus. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], Pref) | |
A reaction: She defends the nice but unusual position that arithmetical knowledge is both a priori and empirical (so that those two notions are not, as usually thought, opposed). I am a big Carrie Jenkins fan. |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: A problem for the neo-Fregeans is that it has not proved easy to establish that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: It is also asked how we would know the principle, if it is indeed analytic or definitional (Jenkins p.119). |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: What concept grounding does for us is ensure that our concepts, like the results of our empirical tests, can be treated as a source of information about the independent world. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably we learn our concepts hand-in-hand with experience, so learning our concepts is itself learning about the world. Later checking of concepts and their relations largely confirms what we already knew? |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
Full Idea: Dependence comes in essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive forms. | |
From: report of Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 1.2) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: You'll have to look up Jenkins for the details. |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Concepts which are indispensably useful for categorising, understanding, explaining, and predicting our sensory input are likely to be ones which map the structure of that input well. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.6) | |
A reaction: Anti-realists about classification seem to think that we just invent an array of concepts, and then start classifying with them. The truth seems to be that the actual classes of worldly thing have generated our concepts. |
16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't. | |
From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2 | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible. |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Examining accurate concepts can help us acquire true beliefs about the world, examining justified concepts can help us acquire justified beliefs about the world, and examining grounded concepts can help us acquire knowledge of it. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This summarises Jenkins's empirical account of concepts, and I love it all to bits. I feel that contemporary philosophy is beginning to produce a coherent naturalistic worldview which can replace religion. Bar the rituals. We can have priests... |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: The mere reliability of intuition is not a satisfactory ground for saying it is a source of knowledge - we need to know why it is reliable to understand whether it can be a source of knowledge. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 6.5) | |
A reaction: My theory is that intuition is simply believing things for reasons which we have either forgotten, or (more likely) reasons which are too complex or subtle to be articulated. Intuition feels rational, because it is rational. Updated view of mind needed. |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: I propose that knowledge is true belief which can be well explained .....just by citing the proposition believed. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: I don't find this appealing, and my reservation about Jenkins's book is her reliabilist, externalist epistemology. I would add an internalist coherentist epistemology to her very nice theory. 'I believe there are fairies at the bottom of my garden'? |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations. |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component). | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations. |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do. |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation. |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained. |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms. |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation. |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: I think the physical effects of the world on the brain explain our possessing the concepts we do. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan for a thought which strikes me as exactly right. |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Grounded concepts are like trustworthy on-board maps of the independent world. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: You'll probably need more than one concept for it to qualify as a 'map', but I like this idea a lot. The world, rather than we ourselves, creates our concepts. The opposite of the view of Geach in 'Mental Acts'. |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: I find an updated verificationism plausible, in which we say something meaningful just in case we employ only concepts whose possession could be justified or disjustified by sensory input. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Wow! This is the first time I have ever had the slightest sympathy for verificationism. It saves my favourite problem case - of wild but meaningful speculation, for example about the contents of another universe. A very nice idea. |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Success semantics is the attempt to understand mental representation by thinking about the ways in which representing the world can lead to success in action. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 6.3) | |
A reaction: I take this to be what is also known as 'teleological semantics'. It sounds to me as if this might help to explain success in action, but isn't going to explain the representations that result in the success. |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
Full Idea: 'Analytic' might mean conceptually true, or true in virtue of meaning, or where the predicate is contained in the subject, or for sentences which define something, or where meaning is sufficient for the truth. | |
From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: The second one says meaning grounds the truth, where the last one says meaning entails the truth. |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing). |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily. |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor. |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1) | |
A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities? |