4 ideas
16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't. | |
From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2 | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible. |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Lewis is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the view that de re modal predicates are ambiguous. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Survival and Identity, with postscript [1983]) by Lynne Rudder Baker - Why Constitution is not Identity n25 |
12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously. |
12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: He who can finally make predictions with success must be said to have become sufficiently proficient in nature. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Is prediction achieved by knowledge of laws, or knowledge of essences and powers? The trouble with most laws is that they permit exceptions. 'Things fall, unless prevented' etc. |