3 ideas
| 16051 | Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L] |
| Full Idea: When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence. | |
| From: Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1 | |
| A reaction: This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong! |
| 16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't. | |
| From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2 | |
| A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible. |
| 16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: Lewis is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the view that de re modal predicates are ambiguous. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Survival and Identity, with postscript [1983]) by Lynne Rudder Baker - Why Constitution is not Identity n25 |